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VOLUME 1975 NUMBER 5
THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL FUND SHARES-
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SEC REGULATION
Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940' (Investment
Company Act) prohibits the sale of mutual fund shares to the public
"except at a current public offering price described in the prospectus." 2
Congress enacted this requirement, commonly known as the retail price
maintenance 3 provison, to control a number of inequitable and disrup-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Investment Company
Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970) (emphasis added) states in full:
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued
by it to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for dis-
tribution or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus, and,
if such class of security is being currently offered to the public by or through
an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer shall
sell any such security to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter,
or the issuer, except at a current public offering price described in the prospec-
tus. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a sale made (i) pursuant to an
offer of exchange permitted by section 80a-l1 of this title including any offer
made pursuant to section 80a-1 (b) of this title; (ii) pursuant to an offer made
solely to all registered holders of the securities, or of a particular class or series
of securities issued by the company proportionate to their holdings or propor-
tionate to any cash distribution made to them by the company (subject to ap-
propriate qualifications designed solely to avoid issuance of fractional securi-
ties); or (iii) in accordance with rules and regulations of the Commission
made pursuant to subsection (b) of section 80a-12 of this title.
3. The term "retail price maintenance," when used in reference to the pricing
uniformity required by § 22(d), differs from its use in reference to the pricing of other
items. Generally, retail price maintenance permits a producer to establish a uniform
sales price to which retailers must adhere when selling to the public. See Bowman, The
Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 825 (1955);
Note, The Impending Demise of Resale Price Maintenance, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 68.
Section 22(d), by prohibiting sales except at a uniform price, requires that a uniform
price be set (presumably by the fund, adviser, or underwriter) in the prospectus and
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tive practices in the distribution of mutual fund shares.4 Developments
since its enactment have cast doubt on the continued necessity of section
22(d). Many of the abuses to which the section was initially addressed
have been corrected,5 and the provision, with its anti-competitive im-
pact,6 has come to be viewed as a cause of "inequities and inefficien-
cies."7
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has responded to
these changed conditions by taking a number of steps "intended to
reduce or eliminate many of the inequities and inefficiencies" of the
mutual fund distribution system "while at the same time avoiding the
dangers of a sudden abolition of retail price maintenance."8 This Note
followed by retailers. See The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NoTRE DAMn
LAW. 732, 838-39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Survey]. Since other sections of the
Investment Company Act provide for the computation of a uniform price in relation to
the fund's net assets, see note 15 infra, only the sales charge is "maintained" by § 22(d).
See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text.
The pricing requirement of § 22(d) has also been termed "resale price maintenance,"
Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 37 U. DEr. L.J. 369, 369 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Greene],
and "uniform price maintenance," Simpson & Hodes, The Continuing Controversy
"Surrounding the Uniform Price Maintenance Provisions of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 718, 718 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Simpson &
Hodes].
The term "retail price maintenance" is used by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and has been adopted herein.
4. Part I1 of this Note discusses the debate over the purposes for which § 22(d)
was enacted. See notes 40-54 infra and accompanying text (disruption of the distribu-
tion system and discrimination in pricing among investors); notes 55-76 infra and
accompanying text (dilution of investors' interest resulted from backward pricing system
which offered insiders an opportunity for riskless trading).
5. Reforms since the enactment of § 22(d) include "forward pricing," see notes
74-75 infra, and twice-daily pricing, see note 74 infra.
6. Unlike state fair trade laws, § 22(d) requires rather than permits the fixing of
a price at which a fund's shares are sold to the public, thus precluding competition
between dealers retailing shares of the same fund. This requirement is an exception to
the general national policy against price fixing expressed in the Sherman Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Cf. notes 263-84 infra and accompanying text.
7. Letter of transmittal from Ray Garret, Chrm. of SEC, to Sen. John Sparkman,
Chrm. of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, undated, reprinted in
SEC, MtrruAL FuN DISTRIBUTION AND SECION 22(d) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
Acr OF 1940, at v (1974) [hereinafter cited as Transmittal Letter].
8. Transmittal Letter v. The letter further stated:
The Conmmission has concluded that price competition at the retail level is a
desirable goal. It appears to us, however, that the immediate abolition of Sec-
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will discuss the recent changes in SEC regulation of mutual fund
distribution and assess the consequences that may arise from these
modifications.
I. THE MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
An "open-end investment company," 9 or mutual fund, invests capital,
derived from the sale of its own equity securities, in the securities of
other corporations. The fund's "investment adviser" selects the invest-
ments,10 controls the activities of the fund, 1 and typically serves as
9. For purposes of the Investment Company Act, § 3-5 define open-end invest-
ment companies, which are also known colloquially as mutual funds. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3 to -5 (1970). Section 3(a) defines an "investment company" as
any issuer which (1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily. . . in
the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (2) is engaged
or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face amount certificates of the
installment type... ; or (3) is engaged... in the business of investing, rein-
vesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to ac-
quire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value
of such issuer's total assets ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1970). See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b) (1970) (exemptions from §
3(a)(3)).
Section 4 divides investment companies into three classes: face-amount certificate
companies, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(l) (1970) (issuer of "face-amount certificates of the
installment type"); unit investment trusts, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2) (1970) (organized
under trust indenture; no board of directors; issues only redeemable securities represent-
ing undivided interest in group of specified securities); and management companies, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-4(3) (1970) (any other investment company).
Section 5(a) classifies management companies as "open-end" and "close-end" as
follows:
(I) "Open-end company" means a management company which is offering for
sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the issuer.
(2) "Close-end company" means any management company other than an
open-end company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1970). The factor that distinguishes open-end from close-end
companies is the redeemable character of the securities issued. Shares in close-end
companies are not redeemable; an investor who owns shares in an open-end investment
company (a mutual fund) may redeem his shares at any time, see note 22 infra, for their
"net asset value," see note 23 infra.
In July 1974, 798 mutual fund issues were available. 40 SEC ANN. REP. 153 (1974).
The 197 available issues of close-end company shares are similar to equity securities of
publicly-held corporations, and are traded on exchanges or over-the-counter. Id.
10. The Investment Company Act refers to an investment adviser as an "advisory
board," defined as
a board . . . distinct from the board of directors . . . of an investment com-
pany . . . composed solely of persons who do not serve such company in any
other capacity . . . [which] has advisory functions as to investments but has
no power to determine that any security or other investment shall be purchased
or sold by such company.
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underwriter for the distribution of the mutual fund's shares.1 2
Section 22' 3 of the Investment Company Act regulates the distribu-
tion of mutual fund shares. Specifically, subsection (d) requires that
the total price paid by public purchasers be uniform.1 4  This "public
offering price" includes the price of the naked share"r and a sales
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(1) (1970). See SEC, REPORT ON THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF A REPEAL OF SECnON 22(d) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY Acr OF 1940 at
12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 STUDY]:
Mutual funds are seldom managed along conventional corporate lines by
their own officers and directors. The typical fund is said to be "externally
managed." This means that most or even all of its work is done for it not
by its own officers or employees, but by a separate company.
See also S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969); Werner, Protecting the Mutual
Fund Investor: The SEC Reports on the SEC, 68 COLUM. L 1Ev. 1, 8-10, 17 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Werner].
11. "The adviser presides over the fund's birth and generally remains in control of it
throughout its life." 1972 STUmY 13. See Survey 750 ("the adviser is . . . the
ringmaster and the mutual fund is the seal"); Note, Mutual Funds and Their Advisers:
Strengthening Disclosure and Shareholder Control, 83 YALE LJ. 1475 (1974); Note, The
Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of Business Incest, 71 YALE
L.J. 137 (1961).
12. 1972 STUmY 13. Mutual funds compensate their adviser-underwriters for both
advisory and underwriting services. Because new sales may increase the advisory fee,
see note 26 infra, "in a substantial number of cases advisory income [is] used to
subsidize the underwriting function." SEC, MuTuAL FuiND DISTmIUTION AND SECTION
22(d) oF THE IN VMsENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 at 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1974 REPORT]. For no-load funds, the advisory fee is the only compensation. See notes
300-01 infra and accompanying text.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1970). Subsection (a) gives the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) the authority to regulate pricing and the time of calculation
"for the purpose of eliminating . . . any dilution of the value of other outstanding
securities . . . " See notes 57-63 infra. Subsection (b) allows the NASD to prohibit
"an excessive sales load [allowing] for reasonable compensation for sales personnel . . .
and for reasonable sales loads to investors." See notes 210-17 infra. Subsection (c)
provides that the SEC may supersede the authority that subsection (a) grants the NASD.
Subsection (d) imposes the retail price maintenance requirement. Subsection (e) limits
the conditions under which the right of redemption may be suspended. See note 22
infra. Subsection (f) requires disclosure of restrictions on the transferability of shares,
and gives the SEC authority to adopt rules limiting such restrictions. Subsection (g)
prohibits the sale of mutual fund shares in return for services or property other than cash
or securities.
14. Investment Company Act § 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970), quoted in
note 2 supra.
15. A mutual fund share, like any equity security, represents a fractional undivided
property interest in the net assets of the fund. Since the assets of the fund are invested
in securities whose value is readily calculable, the value of the interest represented by a
share is readily ascertainable. Since the underlying securities fluctuate in value, how-
ever, the value and therefore the price of mutual fund shares change accordingly.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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charge, or "load."'16 The Investment Company Act requires that the
price of naked shares in a fund be fixed by calculating a pro rata share
of the fund's current net assets.17 Since the total price of shares must be
uniform, and the only other payment made by an investor is the sales
load,'" section 22(d), in effect, requires that the sales load charged for
sales of shares in a particular fund be uniform. Consequently, this
uniformity prevents price competition among retail dealers selling shares
in the same fund.19
The accounting methods used to value the net assets of the fund and the timing of the
calculation are regulated by the NASD pursuant to authority granted in § 22(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-22(a) (1970). The SEC oversees this NASD regulation. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-22(c) (1970). See note 23 infra.
16. The Investment Company Act § 2(a) (35) defines "sales load" as
the difference between the price of a security to the public and that portion
of the proceeds from its sale which is received and invested or held for invest-
ment by the issuer ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (35) (1970).
The phrase "and invested or held for investment by the issuer" in the definition
accounts for those funds that employ their own sales forces and sell directly to the
public. While the "price . . . to the public" equals the "portion . . .received . ..by
the issuer" (leaving no "difference" to be the sales load), not all of that price is invested.
Some portion pays sales costs. By definition, the fund adds none of the sales load to its
assets; it is "purely a payment for selling effort." 1972 STuDY 3 n.2.
The sales load, calculated as a percentage of the total price, see note 32 infra, is
typically 8.5%. Largely because of discounts on large purchases, see notes 175-78 infra
and accompanying text, sales loads on mutual fund sales in 1970 averaged only 5.7%.
1974 REPORT 23 n.5.
The division of the sales load between the underwriter and dealer is another important
economic feature of the distribution system. On a typical load of 8.5%, the dealer
retains 7.0%. 1974 REPORT 30. In some instances, underwriters have permitted dealers
to retain the entire load. Id. at 31-32. In these cases the underwriter is compensated
solely by the advisory fee. See note 12 supra.
Some funds, called "no-load funds," charge no load on sales. They have grown from
5.1% of industry assets in mid-1966, 1974 REPORT 19, to 13.8% in mid-1974, 40 SEC
ANN. REP. 153 (1974). No-load funds accounted for 19% of all mutual fund sales in
the three years from 1971 through 1973. 1974 REPoRT 21. The advisory fee compen-
sates no-load fund underwriters. For a discussion of the lack of retail dealer compensa-
tion for the sale of no-loads and the resultant problems, see notes 300-01 infra and
accompanying text.
17. See notes 15 supra & 23 infra.
18. See note 16 supra (sales load defined as purchase price minus amount invested).
19. Although § 22(d) precludes price competition between retailers, it does not
prevent competition between funds for a larger share of the market. This competition
would seem to encourage funds to lower their sales loads to attract investors. To the
contrary, however, the mutual fund industry believes that investors respond to sales
efforts by retailers rather than low sales loads. Therefore, to encourage retailers to
devote more effort to selling shares of their fund, funds raise the sales load to increase
retailer compensation. Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking &
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Except for the retail price maintenance requirement, mutual fund
shares are distributed in a manner similar to shares of any equity
security: 20 the fund, as issuer, sells shares to the public through an
underwriter and a network of retail dealers. Mutual fund distributions,
however, differ significantly from equity security distributions in several
respects. First, a mutual fund shareholder may redeem his shares21 at
any time22 for his proportionate share of the fund's net assets;28 to
balance these redemptions, funds distribute new shares continuously. 24
Second, if sales exceed redemptions, the net assets of the fund tend to
increase.2 5  Moreover, the advisory fee paid to the adviser-underwriter
traditionally is calculated as a percentage of the net assets.26 Since an
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 143 (1967); Survey 836; text accompanying
note 31 infra.
20. Because mutual fund shares are securities, their sale is subject to the applicable
federal securities laws. Although the Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970),
requires the registration of the distribution of securities, mutual funds register their sales
differently. Section 24(a) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(a)
(1970), provides that "in lieu of . . . the information and documents specified in
schedule A of [15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970)]," funds may file a registration statement
containing the information that funds are required to file under Investment Company
Act §§ 8, 29, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, 80a-29 (1970).
21. By definition, the shares of an open-end investment company are redeemable;
that is, an investor may sell them back to the fund. Investment Company Act §
5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1970). See note 9 supra.
22. Section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act protects the investor's right of
redemption from suspension or postponement for more than seven days except under
unusual circumstances, such as a SEC order or inability of the company to determine
the value of its assets. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970). See SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 5571 (Dec. 20, 1968); Survey 834 n.633; Note, Investment Companies
and Restricted Securities: Pearls or Perils?, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 516, 530-34 (1970).
23. The "net asset value" of a share is computed by dividing the value of the net
assets of the fund by the number of its outstanding shares. Section 22(a)(1) authorizes
the NASD to adopt rules assuring redemption pricing in "relation to the current net asset
value . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a)(1) (1970). Further, a mutual fund share is a
"redeemable security," defined by the Investment Company Act § 2(a) (32) as
any security.. . under the terms of which the holder. . . is entitled . . . to
receive approximately his proportionate share of the issuer's current net assets
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (1970) (emphasis added).
24. Shares issued by the fund are somewhat analogous to treasury shares bought and
sold by a corporation. Whether the shares are termed "new" or viewed as redeemed
shares being "reissued" is of no practical importance.
25. Two other variables affect the net assets of a fund: fluctuations in the value of
securities in which the fund has invested its assets and services for which the fund must
pay.
26. The advisory fee is paid to the fund adviser for "externalized services" such as
the selection and management of investments and, frequently, almost all other aspects of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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increase in net assets results in a commensurate increase in the advisory
fee, adviser-underwriters attempt to maximize their funds' sales-to-re-
demption ratio27 by selling as many shares as possible. This continuous
process of sale and redemption, coupled with the increased compensation
from a high rate of sales, makes the distribution system an integral part
of the operation of any mutual fund.
Third, to sell as many shares as possible, adviser-underwriters com-
pete for the favor of retail dealers.28 Section 22(d) requires that the
fund set, 29 and dealers adhere to,1° a fixed sales load. The confluence
of these two requirements results in
what has been described as "perverse competition" [between adviser-
underwriters] because it is cost-raising rather than cost-lowering. It is
a competition for the favor and services of fund dealers and salesmen
the fund's operation. Werner, supra note 10, at 8-10. It is typically calculated as one-
half of one percent of fund assets per year. 1974 REPORT 24-25 (chart III, note 2).
27. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1969):
[Tihis underwriting function . .. may be performed at cost or even at a
loss. The real financial return to the underwriter . . . in these instances is
the management [adviser's] fee which increases automatically as the fund
grows in size.
There is no economic necessity that mutual funds always maintain sales in excess of
redemptions. Although the industry experienced "net redemptions" (i.e., redemptions
exceeded sales) in 1972 and 1973, 1974 REPORT 21 (Table I; load and no-load funds),
these amounts were not a threat when measured against the total industry assets. While
the "possibility of ruinous redemption" is recognized by many, Survey 834-35, it does not
justify the statement that "it is important that sales always exceed redemptions lest the
company be required to liquidate its holdings . . . ." Hodes, Current Developments
Under Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act, 13 B.C. IND. & COMm. L. REV.
1061, 1063 n.8 (1972) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Hodes].
It should be noted, however, that the industry's fear of a high rate of redemptions is
based on more than a desire to maintain the size of the advisory fee. A high rate of
turnover, whether redemptions or new sales, requires the fund to hold an increased
portion of its assets in liquid or readily liquidable assets, such as cash or short-term
notes. Since such assets yield a diminished or no return, the performance of the fund is
impaired, a result that fund advisers legitimately fear.
28. 1974 REPORT 5 n.5; 1972 STUDY, supra note 10, at 14; Survey, supra note 3, at
836.
29. Obviously, either the mutual fund or the adviser-underwriter must set the sales
load in order to guarantee uniformity. Since funds are controlled by their adviser-
underwriters, see notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text, the adviser-underwriters
actually set sales loads and determine the portion to be retained by retail dealers.
30. "[N]o dealer shall sell any such [redeemable] security to any person except a
dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at a current public offering price
. .. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). The Investment Company Act § 48 provides
for maximum penalties of $10,000 fine and two years imprisonment, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48
(1970).
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rather than the conventional form of competition for the favor of in-
vestors. This vigorous competition for dealer interest results in power-
ful upward pressures on selling compensation and sales loads and be-
cause of Section 22(d), the countervailing [downward] pressures of
retail price competition cannot operate.81
As a result, sales loads, calculated as a percentage of the total share
price,8 2 have risen from an average of 5 percent in 194031 to a typical
8.5 percent today.34
Reasoning that the high level of sales loads is symptomatic of prob-
lems within the mutual fund distribution system,8" the SEC "concluded
that price competition at the retail level is a desirable goal."30 In so
concluding, the SEC rejected retail price maintenance, exercised its
administrative authority to introduce limited variations in the pricing
structure of sales loads,37 and suggested replacement or amendment of
section 22(d). 8
11. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF SECTION 22(d)
The debate over section 22(d) has sparked renewed interest in its
legislative history.3 Commentators have attempted to identify the
problems that compelled its passage in order to determine whether
section 22(d) is still necessary.
The "traditional" justification4" for the retail price maintenance provi-
31. Hearings on H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 110 (1967).
32. By calculating the sales load as a percentage of the total price, rather than the
share, the figure appears to be smaller. For example, an $8.50 sales load calculated as a
percentage of a total purchase of $100.00 equals 8.5%. If that same $8.50 sales load is
computed as a percentage of the investor's initial interest in the fund's assets ($91.50),
the sales load would equal 9.3 %.
33. 1974 REPORT 30.
34. Id.
35. See text accompanying notes 80-85 infra.
36. Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at iv. See 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 10-
11.
37. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8570, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 423 (1974).
38. Id. See 1974 REPORT 115-21; notes 318-24 infra and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Heffernan & Jorden, Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of
1940-Its Original Purpose and Present Function, 1973 DuKn L.. 975, 975-98 [herein-
after cited as Heffernan & Jorden]; Hodes, supra note 27; North, A Brief History of
Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NoTRE DAME LAW. 677, 680-84 (1969);
Simpson & Hodes, supra note 3, at 719; Survey 804-05.
40. Immediately following passage of the Investment Company Act, the retail pricehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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sion is that Congress passed it to "insure the orderly distribution" of
mutual fund shares,4 to "prevent discrimination" in pricing by dealers
selling shares to the public, 42 and to avoid "cut-price competition"f4
with the primary distribution system by "bootleg"44 broker-dealers.
The threat to orderly distribution and the cut-price competition re-
sulted from the so-called "bootleg" market maintained by broker-dealers
not under contract with the mutual fund's underwriter.45  Sales con-
tracts between underwriters and retailers required retail dealers to sur-
render a part of their sales load to the underwriter.46 Noncontract or
"bootleg' broker-dealers purchased shares from the public at slightly
more than net asset (redemption) value, sold them at slightly less than
the public offering price, and retained the entire difference.1 Since
maintenance provision of § 22(d) received remarkably little attention. See, e.g.,
Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WAsH. U.L.Q. 303, 330-32 (1941)
(discussing § 22 without reference to § 22(d)). In 1959, Lawrence M. Greene, then
Assistant Director of the Division of Corporate Regulation of the SEC, outlined his
interpretation of the purposes of § 22(d). Greene, supra note 3. Greene first stated
that "[a]Ithough the reasons for section 22(d) were not articulated by its proponents at
the legislative hearings, the objectives were well known in the industry and to the
Commission." Id. at 371. In support of the three "well-known" purposes, Greene cited
only two industry memoranda written in 1958. Id. at 371 n.10, citing NASD Memoran-
dum 2-4, February 5, 1958, SEC File No. 57-170-1, Proposal to Adopt Rule 22d-1;
N.A.I.C. Memorandum 1-2, June 24, 1958, SEC File No. 57-170-1. It seems unlikely
that the congressional purposes that prompted passage of § 22(d) could be "well-known"
and yet escape exposition for eighteen years.
41. Greene 371. See 1 L. Loss, SucuRrnIs REGULATrON 404-05 (2d ed. 1961).
42. Greene 371. See 1 L. Loss, SucuRnFs REGUIATION 404-05 (2d ed. 1961).
43. Greene 371.
44. In the primary distribution system of mutual funds, the fund issues the shares
and sells them to the public through an underwriter and a network of retail dealers under
contract with the underwriter. See text accompanying and following note 20 supra.
When their sales contracts permitted, retail dealers often functioned as brokers. They
etablished a secondary market in which investors could trade in the shares of that fund,
paying a brokerage fee equal to the sales load. This secondary trading posed little threat
to the primary distribution system because the brokerage compensation paid to a member
of the primary distribution system could be substituted for the sales load revenues
that were lost. The "bootleg" market, on the other hand, disrupted the established sales
load because bootleg dealers charged a brokerage fee lower than the sales load and
diverted revenue from the primary distribution system of which bootleg dealers were not
a part.
45. See SEC, REPORT ON INvEsTMENT TRusTs AND INvFs T mNT CoNTA uas 850-65
(1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940 REPORT].
46. Id. at 855. Out of a hypothetical $100 purchase, including a 6% sales load, the
fund typically received $94, the underwriter $2, leaving the dealer $4 as compensation.
47. For example, suppose a fund share sold for $100, including a sales load of 6%,
and was at the same time redeemable for $94. A bootleg dealer could attract sellers byWashington University Open Scholarship
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noncontract broker-dealers surrendered nothing to the underwriter, they
were able to underprice contract dealers and still receive comparable or
greater compensation for sales than contract dealers.48 This competi-
tion diverted revenues from the primary distribution system, and threat-
ened to destroy it.49  Supporters of section 22(d) argue that retail price
maintenance remains necessary to prevent such price cutting by noncon-
tract broker-dealers. 50
"Discrimination" in the sale of mutual fund shares is a more abstract
problem. Since section 22(d) permits no variation in purchase price,51
one commentator concluded that "the provisions of section 22(d) on
their face indicate a purpose to avoid discrimination in the distribution
of redeemable securities"52 consistent with "the fundamental declaration
of policy" of the Investment Company Act.5 3 The notion of discrimina-
tion, however, without determining against whom there is discrimina-
tion, is paradoxical when applied to the sale of mutual fund shares.
While the uniform sales load requirement protects investors from dis-
criminatory variations in price, the requirement discriminates against
those public purchasers who are forced to pay retailers for sales services
they neither desire nor receive. Generally, variations in price that
reflect differences in costs or services are not considered discriminatory. 4
buying at $95 (one dollar higher than redemption value), attract buyers by selling at $99
(one dollar lower than fund's offering price), and retain the $4 difference.
48. 1940 REPORT 856-57, 865. See notes 46 & 47 supra.
49. 1940 REPORT 324-25, 850-65; Greene 371-72; Hodes 1062-63.
50. 1974 REPORT 51, quoting Written comment of Investment Company Institute;
Simpson & Hodes 728-30. See notes 271-77 infra and accompanying text (SEC
interpretation that § 22(d) is not applicable to noncontract broker-dealers).
51. See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
52. Greene 372. See Hodes 1063; Simpson & Hodes 719.
53. Greene 372. The Investment Company Act's "fundamental declaration of
policy" states in part:
Crlhe national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely af-
fected-
(2) when investment companies are organized, operated, [or] managed.
in the interest of [insiders, affiliates, or others] rather than in the interest of
all classes of such companies' security holders;
(3) when investment companies issue securities containing inequitable or
discriminatory provisions, or fail to protect the preferences and privileges of
the holders of their outstanding securities ....
Investment Company Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
54. 1974 REPORT 93 (variations in price in group purchase context):
[IMhere would be no unjust discrimination among investors because differenceshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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Commentators recently55 have questioned whether section 22(d) was
intended to prevent discrimination in price among investors and negate
the disruption caused by the bootleg market. One concluded:
[T]he requirement of a uniform sales load was a compromise provision
designed primarily as a device to curb abuses resulting in dilution of
the value of mutual fund shares, and possibly to impose some limita-
tions on the activities of "non-contract" dealers. Only incidentally
* * , did the section entail the "price-fixing" aspects which are now as-
sumed by many to be its raison d'etre.56
The "dilution abuses" were possible because of the pricing system
that existed in 1940. The price at which funds sell their shares is based
on the market value of the securities in each fund's portfolio. As the
portfolio securities fluctuate in value, so does the value, and therefore
the price, of the fund share. In the pre-1940 market, funds calculated
the value of their portfolios at the close of the market.17  That valuation
set the price at which shares were sold during the following day. By
waiting until late afternoon, an investor could predict the closing prices
for the securities in the fund's portfolio and accurately predict the next
day's price for shares of the fund.58
Insiders were able to take advantage of this riskless opportunity to
choose between the present price and the next day's predicted price
because they had a reduced or no sales load to overcome' and had
rapid access to the information necessary to make an accurate predic-
tion. 0 Average investors, because they paid a full sales load6' and had
in sales charges would relate to differences in both costs and services.
See Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at iv.
55. Heffernan & Jorden 975; Survey 732.
56. Heffernan & Jorden 978 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
57. 1940 REPORT 860. This sytem, known as "backward pricing," continued until
abolished in 1968. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text; Survey 804-05.
During the 1940 congressional hearings, the practice was defended on the ground that
the industry needed a firm price. Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, 514-34, 672-74 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as 1940 Senate Hearings]. See generally Greene 373-75; Heffernan &
Jorden 979.
58. See Heffernan & Jorden 980 & n.20.
59. 1940 Senate Hearings pt. 1, at 142; id., pt. 2, at 842 (insiders paid a price "close
to net asset value"). See Survey 791.
60. 1940 REPORT 852; Survey 791.
61. Since the prevailing sales load in 1940 was between four and five percent, it was
necessary for the per-share value of the fund's portfolio to appreciate at least four or five
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no rapid access to the necessary information, could not take advantage
of this "two-price" system. Thus, the "backward"0 2 pricing system
offered a continuous opportunity for riskless profit-taking by insiders.
Since insider purchases increased the number of shares on days when a
profit was earned by the fund, the profit was distributed among more
shares, or diluted. 3
The 1940 congressional hearings on the Investment Company Act
emphasized the asset-diluting problems of riskless trading under the two-
price system.64 It was at these abuses that section 22 of the Investment
Company act was aimed. 5 Section 22 of the original bil 0 contained a
provision that would have required shares to be priced as of the first
portfolio valuation after the order to buy or sell was received. 7  This
"forward pricing' requirement would have eliminated the two-price
opportunity.
percent before an investor could break even. Short-term fluctuations of this magnitude
were uncommon, and this hurdle, coupled with the investor's inability to secure the
requisite information quickly, see text accompanying note 60 supra, made it impossible
for average investors to take advantage of the two-price system. tSurvey 791.
62. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
63. This exaggerated example will illustrate the effect of dilution on the value of
outstanding shares:
On day 1, the Fund has 10 shares outstanding and total assets of $100. Each share is
worth $10.
On day 2, the Fund's portfolio appreciates a dramatic 50%. If no sales or redemp-
tions take place, the Fund would have 10 shares outstanding and total assets of $150.
Each share would be worth $15.
The picture changes, however, if an insider, noting the rise in the Funds portfolio
securities by late afternoon of day 2, buys 10 shares. The price calculated at the end of
day 1 ($10) is still in effect. At the close of day 2, the Fund has 20 shares and total
assets of $250. Each share is worth $12.50. The insider has taken no risk and profited
at the expense of the Fund's shareholders. Survey 790-91.
64. 1940 Senate Hearings 140-45, 151-56, 844-46. One article published soon after
passage of the Investment Company Act noted the problem of dilution. Jaretzki, supra
note 40, at 330-32. But see Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CoRNELL
L.Q. 77, 84-92 (1940) (discussion of Act with no mention of dilution).
65. Heffernan & Jorden 978; Survey, supra note 3, at 849-51.
66. H.R. 8935, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
67. Heffernan & Jorden 986 & n.42.
[H]ad [forward pricing] been adopted at the time of the enactment of the
1940 Act, the principal abuses which section 22(d) was designed to curb
would have been eliminated, and [section 22(d)] would probably not have
been enacted, or, if enacted, would have been addressed more specifically to
the problems generated by the activities of "non-contract" dealers.
Id. at 981.
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Rather than requiring forward pricing,s Congress adopted the sec-
tion 22(d) requirement that all sales take place at a uniform price. In
response to industry opposition,69 Congress replaced the proposed for-
ward pricing provision with subsections (a), (c), and (d) of section 22
of the Investment Company Act.70 Subsections (a) and (c) permit the
adoption of rules "for the purpose of eliminating. . . any dilution of
the value of outstanding securities. '71 Subsection (d), by requiring all
purchasers, including insiders, to pay the same sales load, prevented
quick profit-taking by insiders because they too had to overcome the
sales load before realizing a profit.7 2
Those who argue that section 22(d) should be repealed maintain that
subsequent reforms sufficiently preclude the dilution abuses that existed
in 1940.73 Funds now sell their shares at the first price calculated after
an order to buy or sell is received. 4 The adoption of forward pricing in
196875 abolished the two-price system that had enabled insiders to trade
at the expense of other investors. 76  Absent any potential for the abuses
that section 22(d) was designed to prevent, the continuation of retail
price maintenance appears unjustified.
68. The industry had suggested that "no securities issued by an investment company
... be sold to insiders or anyone other than an underwriter or dealer except on the
same terms as are offered to other investors." 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 57, at
526, 548-56. 859. Rather than devise a more specific means to insure insider purchases
"on the same terms" as public purchases, Congress chose retail price maintenance.
69. Heffernan & Jorden 968-95.
70. Id. at 968-95; Greene, supra note 3, at 373 n.20.
71. Section 22(a) permits a registered securities association (the NASD) to adopt
rules
for the purpose of eliminating or reducing so far as reasonably practicable any
dilution of the value of other outstanding securities of such company or any
other result of such purchase, redemption, or sale which is unfair to holders
of such other outstanding securities ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a) (1970). Section 22(c) gives the SEC authority to adopt rules
"for the accomplishment of the same ends as are prescribed" in § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-22(c) (1970).
72. Requiring insiders to pay a full sales load, however, did not prevent them from
using the two-price system. Insiders could still use the two-price system by timing their
transactions to maximize profit or minimize loss. See note 61 supra.
73. Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 39, at 1007; Survey 805, 848-51.
74. SEC rule 22c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1975). Additionally, shares are now
valued twice daily. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. II, § 26(c) (1974).
75. SEC Rule 22c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1975). See SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 5519 (Oct. 16, 1968).
76. See notes 57-63 supra and accompanying text,
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BI. TnE SEC PROGRAM
After extensive study,77 the SEC concluded that the retail price
maintenance requirement "has produced a distribution system that can
and should be improved.""8  In its report, Mutual Fund Distribution
and Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 194011 (1974
Report), issued in November, 1974, the SEC determined that section
22(d) was an unnecessary exception to the national policy against price-
fixing;80 that purchasers were paying for selling services they neither
wanted, needed, nor received;8 1 that the present regulatory structure
discouraged the use of economical marketing practices; 82 and that the
high level of sales loads8 and the recent extended period of net redemp-
tions reflected these shortcomings. 84 As summarized by then-Chairman
Garrett of the SEC:
The mutual fund industry's historic reliance upon high fixed sales
charges to induce salesmen to "push" fund shares, besides being ex-
pensive for investors, is simply not working today.8 5
The SEC analyzed three approaches to reforming the distribution
process.86 First, the SEC considered retaining retail price maintenance
and simply requiring the NASD to exercise its authority under section
77. The SEC and associated institutions have produced seven reports dealing with
mutual fund distribution. SEC, INsTrrUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); SEC, THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GRowTH, H.R. RP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited
as 1966 REPORT]; SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF Trm SEcURrrIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc.
No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); SECURTrrIEs RES EARCH UNIT, WHARTON SCHOOL
OF THE UNIV. OF PA., A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962); 1974 REPORT, supra note 12; 1972 STUDY, supra note 10; NASD, AN
ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL FUNDS AND VARIABLE ANNUITIES
(1972).
78. Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at iv.
79. 1974 REPORT, supra note 12.
80. Id. at 76-77. See note 6 supra.
81. 1966 REPORT 221; 1972 STUDY 7.
82. 1974 REPORT 86; Transmittal Letter iv.
83. 1974 REPORT 80:
The fund industry's virtually total reliance upon incentives to "sell" fund shares
has not forestalled a state of extended net redemptions; and there are no clear
signs that the situation is likely to improve under the present marketing strat-
egy.
84. 1974 REPORT 19, 21-22, 80.
85. Transmittal Letter iv.
86. 1974 REPORT 76-83.
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22(b) to establish a maximum permissible sales load.17  The SEC
rejected this alternative because
[i]t would perpetuate the inefficiencies and inequities of the current
distribution system, and it would be based upon a presumption that [a]
maximum sales charge rule... would be an appropriate substitute for
increased price competition, a presumption contrary to our own analy-
sis . . .. 88
Second, the SEC considered the immediate abolition of retail price
maintenance,"9 through either congressional repeal of section 22(d) or
SEC administrative action.90 The SEC, expressing fear that an immedi-
ate move to negotiated sales loads might further decrease sales of new
shares,9" declined to move precipitously to a fully competitive environ-
ment.92 Moreover, the SEC admitted that the marketing problems of
the mutual fund industry were partly the regulator's fault:
[Tihe present regulatory system.., has inhibited the development of a
demand 'pull' by prohibiting the fund industry from using the market-
ing devices relied upon by most other businesses: lower prices, effective
advertising, and mass marketing techniques such as group discounts.93
Reasoning that the repeal of section 22(d) must be preceded by this
"development of a demand 'pull,' "94 the SEC adopted its third alterna-
87. Id. at 76-77. The 1974 REPORT described this alternative as involving
no major modifications of the law presently governing fund distribution except
implementation of a meaningful maximum sales load rule; the mutual fund dis-
tribution system's basic reliance upon fixed sales loads. . . would remain un-
changed.
Id. at 76. It would seem that Congress mandated some action in this direction when it
amended § 22(b) in 1970. See notes 210-17 infra and accompanying text.
88. 1974 REPoRT 76.
89. id. at 78-81.
90. See notes 318-24 infra and accompanying text.
91. 1974 REPORT79.
92. Id. See id. at 72, quoting Testimony of Dr. Donald Farrar, Professor of Eco-
nomics, U.C.L.A.: "There are some very serious problems which are an accumulation of
an evolutionary process ...."
93. Id. at 79. The mutual fund industry has traditionally relied upon high sales
compensation to encourage retailers to sell ("push") mutual fund shares. At the same
time, SEC regulation has prevented the use of mass marketing techniques to develop a
large purchasing population. If a large purchasing population were developed, it would
exert a demand (a "pull") for shares. However, the industry is reluctant to move in
this direction. Mutual fund representatives continue to argue that extensive selling
eforts are necessary. Id. at 53. Because the industry has continued to rely upon
individual salesmen as its primary selling technique, no significant "pull" has developed
and extensive selling efforts continue to be necessary.
94. Id. at 79.
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tive, the gradual modification of the mutual fund distribution system.",
The recommended program, now partly implemented, includes seven
major changes. Less restrictive regulation of advertising allows a wider
"cultivation of public demand." 90  A new group purchase rule now
permits a wider variety of groups to aggregate mutual fund purchases to
qualify for quantity discounts.9 7 Underwriters may provide "open sea-
sons" during which investors of record may purchase additional shares
at reduced or no load. 8 The SEC will consider exemptions from
section 22(d) when retailers sell mutual fund shares in combination
with other financial products.9 9 The SEC is also encouraging second-
ary trading in mutual fund shares.' 0 The SEC approved the new
NASD maximum sales load rule limiting sales loads to 81/z percent. 101
Finally, proposed legislation will be sent to Congress to clarify the SEC's
authority to introduce more competition into the mutual fund distribu-
tion system.' 0 2  Although these modifications are aimed at "allowing
the industry voluntarily to move toward price competition,"' 03 the SEC
is considering "more far reaching administrative actions"' 0 4 that "could
go as far as prohibiting retail maintenance."'' 0
This comprehensive revision has met substantial opposition. 0 6 The
95. Id. at 81-82. The recent modifications in SEC regulations under § 22(d) are
intended to encourage transition "to a stage where [the industry] might be able to adjust
to full price competition. . . ." Id. at 82. See note 93 supra.
One industry representative found fault with gradual modification:
[A] partial repeal [of § 22(d)] with the end objective of total repeal would
overhang the industry like a sword of Damocles. Nobody would want to buy
today because prices may be reduced later.
1974 REPORT 57, quoting Written comment of Union Service Corp.
96. Transmittal Letter vi. See 1974 REPORT 84-88; notes 134-74 infra and accom-
panying text.
97. 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 89-93. See notes 187-206 infra and accompany-
ing text.
98. 1974 REPORT 93-97. See notes 238-52 infra and accompanying text.
99. 1974 REPORT 97-101. See notes 253-58 infra and accompanying text.
100. 1974 REPORT 104-09. See notes 259-99 infra and accompanying text.
101. 1974 REPORT 122-29. See notes 207-37 infra and accompanying text.
102. 1974 REPORT 115-21. See Transmittal Letter vii; notes 318-24 infra and accom-
panying text.
103. Transmittal Letter vii.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The SEC held hearings on all proposed modifications before writing the 1974
Report containing the recommended program. See generally 1974 REPORT 51-75. The
hearings were designed to "accommodate, to the extent possible, the interests of both
investors and the industry." Id. at 76. Fifty-six of the 59 participants who testifiedhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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mutual fund industry generally has opposed any modifications other
than a loosening of restrictions on advertising.' 07 Full retail price
competition, the industry fears, will drive smaller dealers out of busi-
ness1 08 and reduce both sales and personalized services.' 0 9  Moreover,
the industry believes that the opportunity for secondary trading,1 0
increased eligibility for group discounts,"' and the maximum sales load
rule 2 will further reduce sales compensation, while liberalized advertis-
ing regulations" 3 will only partially compensate for this reduction." 4
Since retailers "have consistently sold products which pay the most
money," 1 5 the industry argues that any net decrease in sales compensa-
tion would cause "further reductions in sales and further increases in
losses or alternatively, a discontinuance of active selling efforts."'" 6
The most convincing argument raised by members of the mutual fund
industry is that they have come to rely on the uniform price requirement
of section 22(d).1 7  This reliance has been so great that the industry
maintains:
were members of, or affiliated with, the mutual fund industry. One investor testified.
Id. at Appendix VI. See North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legis-
lation, 44 NoTRE DAME LAw. 677, 697 (1969) ("During the course of the ninety-first
Congress we may witness a repetition of the industry-government cooperative endeavors
which produced the original Act").
107. 1974 REPORT 51-60.
108. Id. at 55.
109. Id. at 54-55. See id. at 55, quoting Written comment of the Putnam Manage-
ment Co.:
[Pirice competition will cause dealers' profit margins to shrink, in turn causing
the quality of the sales effort to decline. Mutual funds must be sold properly
if the investor is to be sold funds and programs suitable to his needs.
110. 1974 REPORT 104-09. See notes 259-99 infra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 187-206 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 207-37 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 134-74 infra and accompanying text.
114. "[A]dvertising alone will not get the job done." 1974 REPORT 53, quoting
Written comment of Phillip C. Smith, Chairman of the Board, National Securities
Research Corp.
115. 1974 REPORT 23, quoting Written comment of Seaboard Corp.
116. 1974 REPORT 55, quoting Statement of Franklin R. Johnson, Keystone Custodian
Funds, Inc.
117. 1974 REPORT 55. See Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 39, at 1007:
Any legislative or administrative action taken in this area, however, must
consider that the mutual fund business has accommodated itself to section
22(d). If the slate were clean, there might be no economic justification [for]
such a sweeping exception to the antitrust laws; but the continued vitality of
the huge mutual fund industry, if truly dependent upon such a pricing structure,
may dictate the continued existence of at least some form of price mainte-
nance.
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.Mhose who would propose regulatory changes which would... affect
the system of distributing mutual fund shares to the public have a heavy
burden to establish that the proposal on balance will serve the public
interest. 118
The SEC response consisted of four major arguments. First, the
SEC noted, investors as well as the mutual fund industry deserve the
protection of SEC regulation."" Second, gradual modification under
administrative supervision can minimize disruption of the distribution
system. 20 Third, the SEC argued, more specific regulation can control
the harmful effects of the abolition of retail price maintenance.121
Finally, exemption, 2 reform of rules,12  and increased opportunities
for less costly distribution 2 4 can cushion any financial difficulties expe-
rienced by the industry.
Other parties concerned with the modifications concentrated on spe-
cific proposals relating to their particular interests. The No-Load Mu-
118. 1974 REPORT 51, quoting Statement of Robert Augenblick, President, Investment
Company Institute.
119. Although much of the 1974 Report appears to be an effort to accommodate or
refute arguments of the mutual fund industry, the basic import of the recommended
program is to reduce inefficiencies, which require higher costs to be passed on to the
investor, and to eliminate inequities in the sale of shares to investors. See 1974 REPoRT
76. But cf. note 106 supra.
120. Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at vii-viii. See 1974 REPORT 81-82, 115-21.
121. See, e.g., notes 259-99 infra and accompanying text (the more specific but less
restrictive regulation of brokered transactions).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970):
The Commission. . . may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person,
security, or transaction... from any provision of this [Act] or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of in-
vestors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this
[Act].
The phrase, "consistent with . . . the purposes fairly intended by the policy and
provisions of this [Act]," makes an identification of the purposes of § 22(d), see notes
39-76 supra and accompanying text, an essential element of the granting of exemptions.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (1970):
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, issue,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as are necessary
or appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred [by this Act] ....
For the purposes of its rules or regulations the Commission may classify per-
sons, securities, and other matters. . . and prescribe different requirements for
different classes ....
See 1974 REPORT 82.
124. These "increased opportunities," which primarily liberalized advertising regula-
tions and expanded eligibility for group sales, represent a compromise intended to ac-
commodate the industry. See 1974 REPoRT 88-89.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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tual Fund Association 125 was principally concerned "with the still archa-
ic and inhibiting" advertising regulations. 126  The American Life
Insurance Association 12 7 successfully argued that variable annuities, 28
although "redeemable securities,' 29 should be exempted from section
22(d) and regulated apart from mutual fund shares.'30 The Justice
125. See note 16 supra. The interest of no-load funds in sales charges "is indirect at
most," 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 60, since they charge none.
126. 1974 REPORT 60, quoting Statement of Donald Samuel, No-Load Mutual Fund
Association.
127. Life insurance companies distribute most of the variable annuities offered. 1972
STUDY, supra note 10, at 60.
128. A variable annuity entitles its owner to a payment that fluctuates according to
the value of a pro rata share of the underlying portfolio of securities. Although variable
annuities include a longevity factor, they are distinguishable from fixed annuities. They
substitute variable payments for fixed amounts and shift the investment risk from the
insurer to the owner. See SEC v. United Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967);
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 77-80 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
129. "Redeemable security" is defined by the Investment Company Act § 2(a) (32)
as
any security, other than short-term paper, under the terms of which the holder,
upon its presentation to the issuer... is entitled.., to receive approximately
his proportionate share of the issuer's current net assets ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (32) (1970). Variable annuities may be redeemed during the
"redemption stage," an initial period the length of which is determined by the variable
annuity contract. 1972 STUDY 62. Variable annuities are therefore a "redeemable
security" within the meaning of the Investment Company Act, and must be sold at a
"uniform public offering price" as required by § 22(d).
130. Prior to 1940, the sale of variable annuities was plagued by neither riskless
trading nor a secondary market. 1974 REPORT 102, 103 n.2. Before 1975, the continued
inclusion of variable annuities under § 22(d) was probably the result of the sale of
most variable annuities by insurance companies' "captive" sales forces, in effect a single
retailer, who will stipulate a uniform price even if variable annuities are exempted from
§ 22(d). 1974 REPORT 102; 1972 STUDY 60.
Accepting the recommendation of the 1974 Report, the SEC proposed new rule 22d-3,
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8775, 6 S.E.C. Dock. 814 (1975), and
adopted the rule with minor amendments, SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
8878, 7 S.E.C. Dock. 528 (1975). The rule provides:
[Any seller of variable annuities] shall ...be exempted from Section 22(d)
to the extent necessary to permit the sale of [variable annuities] at prices
which reflect variations in the sales load ...; Provided, however, that (a)
the prospectus discloses as precisely as possible the amount of the variations
* ' * and (b) any such variations reflect differences in costs or services and
are not unfairly discriminatory against any person.
SEC Rule 22d-3, 40 Fed. Reg. 33970 (1975) (emphasis original). The second require-
ment used the word "reflect" because "variations in ...purchase payments need not
precisely equal variations in costs." SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8878, 7
S.E.C. Dock. 528, 529 (1975).
This exemptive rule was little more than a codification of the many exemptions
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Department unsuccessfully urged the SEC to adopt its second alterna-
tive,181 the immediate abolition of retail price maintenance, in order to
eliminate the unjustifiable anticompetitive effects of section 22(d). " 2
Having considered both the need to introduce retail competition and
the extent of industry dependence on section 22(d), the SEC has begun
to move the industry gradually toward a competitive pricing structure.
In transmitting the 1974 Report, the SEC described the program as one
intended to reduce or eliminate many of the inequities and inefficiencies
of the present fund distribution system while, at the same time, avoiding
the dangers of a sudden abolition of retail price maintenance.' 83
A. Advertising
Personal labor is one of the major costs of mutual fund distribution.
This characteristic is partially attributable to the extensive restrictions
the SEC has imposed on mutual fund advertising.'34 The SEC has
recently modified these restrictions 3 to allow more informative adver-
tising calculated to increase public understanding of mutual funds.
Investor familiarity with funds should reduce the need for extensive sales
presentations and lead to lower overall distribution costs.'8 0
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)'81 7 and its restrictions on
sales literature apply to the sale of mutual fund shares.' 8 8 Although
granted in the past. 1974 REPORT 103 n.1. Since variable annuities are sold by
"captive" sales forces and have already been exempted extensively, exemption from §
22(d) should have little impact on their distribution.
131. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
132. 1974 REPORT 69-71.
133. Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at v.
134. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8571, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 425 (1974);
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8568, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 418 (1974). See 1974
REPORT 84-88. Some members of the industry have argued that the complexity of
mutual funds accounts for their high sales cost. See, e.g., Conference on Mutual Funds,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 777 (1967):
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM:. .. . If you could have expanded advertising, could
you get your story across to the public more cheaply, and therefore be able
to make your sales at a lower over-all cost?
MR. RAYMoND GRTrr: I don't think so, because we have found that the mu-
tual fund, being the complex investment medium that it is, has to be sold by
salesmen.
135. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8571, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 425 (1974).
136. Id. See 1974 REPORT 84-88.
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
138. Although the Investment Company Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (1970), partly
supersedes the Securities Act § 5 registration requirement, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), by
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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other kinds of corporations occasionally sell securities, mutual funds
continuously'"9 offer securities for sale, and therefore are continuously
subject to the Securities Act's restrictions on publicity.140 Section
5(b)(1) of the Securities Act'4 ' prohibits the use of any "prospectus"
that fails to meet the extensive requirements of section 10.142 Section
2(10) defines "prospectus" as "any advertisement. . . which offers any
security for sale"' 43 other than a tombstone advertisement excluded by
section 2(10)(b)'" or a communication accompanied or preceded by a
statutory prospectus. 4 5  Thus, advertising by a mutual fund is illegal
unless (1) it is a section 10 prospectus; (2) it is accompanied by a
section 10 prospectus; or (3) it is a tombstone advertisement that meets
the requirements of section 2(10)(b).
Section 2(10) (b) excludes the familiar tombstone advertisement
from the definition of a prospectus.' 4 6  A tombstone may include only
limited information listed in that section and in rule 134.14 In 1972,
the SEC amended rule 134 to permit inclusion of "a general description
providing a form of continuous registration for mutual fund shares, the other provisions
or the Securities Act are applicable, including the prospectus requirement of § 5(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970). See 1 L. Loss, SECUrIT-ms REui~nXboN 317 n.2 (2d ed. 1961).
139. See notes 24, 27, 29 supra.
140. Generally stated, § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1970), requires that
"offers" to sell securities be made only by means of a statutory prospectus. Virtually all
publicity is deemed an "offer" in the statutory sense, because it may precondition the
market and lead investors to make a decision before receiving the prospectus.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1970).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970) (information required in prospectus).
143. Securities Act § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970):
The term "prospectus" means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement,
letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale ....
144. Securities Act § 2(10)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(b) (1970), quoted in note 146
infra
145. Securities Act § 2(10) (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (a) (1970).
146. Securities Act § 2(10)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(b) (1970), excludes from the §
2 (10) definition of prospectus any
notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication [stating] from whom
a written [statutory] prospectus . . . may be obtained, and, in addition, does
no more than identify the security, state the price thereof, state by whom or-
ders will be executed, and contain such other information as the Commission
* . * may permit.
147. SEC Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1975), is an explanation of the "other
information" that "the Commission. . . may permit" under the § 2(10) (b), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(10)(b) (1970), "tombstone" advertisement exemption from the definition of a
prospectus.
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of an investment company including its general attributes, method of
operation, and services offered."'148
The 1974 Report recommended, 14 and the SEC adopted,'"0 a fur-
ther liberalization of rule 134. Now, tombstone advertisements also
may include information about the particular fund,'5 ' such as its age, 5 2
investment objectives,'-" principal officers, 5 4 aggregate net asset val-
ue,'55 and any illustration from the prospectus "not involving perform-
ance figures."'"" Advertisements including the new information must
148. SEC Rule 134(a)(3)(iil), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(iii) (1972). See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5248 (May 9, 1972) (amendment adopted); SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5213 (Dec. 1, 1971) (amendment proposed). These liberalizations
were limited to permitting advertisements that described mutual funds in general. The
SEC at that time believed that educating the public about mutual funds in general would
generate sufficient public understanding to decrease sales costs and reverse the trend of
net redemptions. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5248 (May 9, 1972). For a
discussion of the industry response, see note 174 infra.
149. 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 84-85.
150. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388 (1974).
151. Compare notes 152-56 infra (information about particular fund) with SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5248 (May 9, 1972) (information restricted to description of
typical fund).
152. SEC Rule 134(a)(3)(iii)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(ili)(C) (expressed
by date of incorporation).
153. While rule 134(a)(3)(il) previously permitted a statement of "whether in the
selection of investments emphasis is placed on income or growth characteristics," the
amended rule permits a more specific "description of such company's investment ob-
jectives and policies . . . ." SEC Rule 134(a)(3)(iii)(A), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)
(3)(iii)(A) (1975). See Dahlberg, From Mattress and Cashbox to Speculative Se-
curities: The Investor and His Mutual Fund, 24 Sw. L.J. 473 (1970).
154. SEC Rule 134(a) (3) (iii) (B), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a) (3) (iii) (B) (1975). The
term "principal officers" is defined in the rule to mean officers, vice presidents "in
charge of a principal business function," and "any other person who performs similar
policy making functions for the company on a regular basis." SEC Rule
134(a)(3)(iii)(H), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(iii)(H) (1975). The term replaced a
proposed amendment which would have permitted identification of "fund directors and
key personnel of the fund adviser." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5357 (Jan. 17,
1973). The change was made to avoid "the possibility that this provision might lend
itself to abuse through appointments to boards of directors of celebrities with no
investment expertise." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388, 388
(1974).
155. SEC Rule 134(a) (3) (iii) (D-E), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a) (3) (iii) (D-E) (1975).
The aggregate net assets may be either those of the fund, or those of all funds managed
by a single adviser-underwriter, or both.
156. SEC Rule 134(a)(3)(iii)(F), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(iii)(F) (1975). The
SEC described this as a "'logical extension' of the attention-getting headline interpreta-
tion," SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388 (1974), that first
appeared in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5248 (May 9, 1972) (adoption of rule
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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contain a strengthened instruction cautioning the investor to obtain and
read the statutory prospectus.' 57
134(a)(3)(iii) codifying earlier interpretations permitting headlines). The attention
that the headline attracts must be directed to announcement of the offering, not to the
securities themselves. See note 161 infra and accompanying text.
Although the rule as amended does not permit tombstone advertisements to include
performance figures since "such information might constitute a selling argument," SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388, 389 (1974), the SEC indicated it
will continue to study the problem, id., and has amended the Statement of Policy to allow
sales literature to contain two new kinds of charts, see notes 163-69 infra.
157. As amended in June 1975, SEC Rule 134(a) (3) (iii)(G), 40 Fed. Reg. 27442
(1975), requires that rule 134 communications contain the following legend:
For more complete information about (Name of Company) including charges
and expenses (get) (obtain) (send for) a prospectus (from (Name and Ad-
dress)) (by sending this coupon). Read it carefully before you invest or
(pay) (forward funds) (send money).
To ensure that investors see the legend, rule 134 requires that it be printed "in a size type
at least as large as, and of a style different from, but at least as prominent as, that used
in the major portion of the advertisement ... " SEC Rule 134(a) (3) (ii) (G) (1), 40
Fed. Reg. 27443 (1975).
This legend requirement, as finally adopted, is much weaker than several legends that
the SEC previously considered. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 5357 (Jan. 17,
1973), the SEC proposed to require the expanded tombstone to contain a statement of
advisory fees, administrative charges, sales loads, and redemption charges, and a coupon
that could be mailed for a prospectus. The coupon would have had to contain, in twelve
point bold-face type, the legend, "Make no payment at this time." Id.
In SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388 (1974), the SEC adopted
an amendment to rule 134, 39 Fed. Reg. 39869 (1974), that required a longer but less
specific legend:
For more complete information about (Name of Company), including sales
charges, management fees, and other expenses, see our prospectus. It is impor-
tant to read the prospectus carefully before you decide to invest. A copy of
the prospectus may be obtained from your securities dealer or by writing to
(Distributor's Address). Send no money.
Id. This formulation of the legend is significant in two respects. First, it dropped the
requirement that expenses, fees, and charges be stated in the advertisement. See
Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. Rnv. 669, 773-74 (1967). However, it
strengthened the final admonition to a single instruction to "[s]end no money."
In SEC Securities Act Release No. 5566, 6 S.E.C. Dock. 211 (1975), the SEC
announced its intention to amend again the legend requirement of rule 134 "to permit
greater utilization of Rule 134 Communications" and to "shorten the wording of the
legend." The proposed amendment would have required a legend stating:
A prospectus containing more complete information about (Name of Com-
pany) including all charges and expenses may be obtained from your securities
dealer or from (Name and Address of Distributor). Read it carefully before
you invest. Send no money.
Id. at 212 (emphasis added). This revision deleted the specific list of possible charges
and consequently rendered the legend less effective in developing investor awareness of
the costs involved in securities dealings.
The deletion was retained by rule 134 as amended. 40 Fed. Reg. 27442 (1975); SEC
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The release announcing the amendments to rule 134158 cautioned that
advertisements must not attempt to sell the security.'" The SEC noted
the
significant difference . . . crucial in terms of the legal requirements
... between selling a product from the face of an advertisement and
attracting the readers' attention and stimulating his interest in obtain-
ing the legally-sanctioned selling document, the statutory prospectus. 160
Although the modifications of rule 134 are designed to permit advertise-
ments to generate interest in the prospectus, not in the shares,' 0 ' the
distinction is probably less clear in the investor's mind than it is in
legal theory.
Securities Act Release No. 5591, 7 S.E.C. Dock. 187 (1975). The final amendments to
the rule 134 legend requirement also substituted a weakened admonition for the formerly
strong directive to "[s]end no money."
The SEC imposed the legend requirement to ensure that tombstone advertisements did
not become vehicles for selling the security. As the amount of information contained in
the tombstone increases, the need increases for instructions to "read the prospectus" and
"send no money." SEC Rule 134(a)(3)(iii)(A-G), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 27442
(1975), now allows tombstones to contain more information than ever. Yet, at the same
time, the SEC has regrettably weakened the cautioning legend.
158. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388 (1974).
159. Written "offers" by means other than a statutory prospectus are generally
prohibited by § 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1970). "Offer"
is defined to include "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to
buy .... " Securities Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) (1970). See notes 138, 142-
43 supra.
See BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 334, at A-l, A-2 (March 17, 1976) (speech by
Anne P. Jones, Director, SEC Division of Investment Management Regulation, to Annual
Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference):
Wondering whether the existing [advertising] rules are themselves really nec-
essary, Ms. Jones conjectured that perhaps all that is really necessary is a rule
prohibiting fraud in advertising and a requirement that investors receive a
prospectus prior to investing.
Such a statement ignores the restrictions which the Securities Act places upon the
advertising of securities. See Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 777
(1967). The Securities Act, rather than an SEC rule or release, restricts such advertis-
ing. Even if such authority were delegated to the SEC, its wisdom is questionable. See
Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 286 (1940):
mhe expertness of the [mutual fund] managers was evidenced chiefly by the
way in which their literature safely skirted the borderlines of fraudulent mis-
representation. ...
160. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388, 389 (1974). See
notes 138, 142-43 supra.
161. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 388, 389 (1974).
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The various "anti-fraud" provisions of the Securities Act,16 2 which
prohibit false or misleading statements, also apply to mutual fund sales.
In 1950, the SEC adopted a Statement of Policy 6 3 which describes how
the past performance of a mutual fund may be portrayed without being
misleading. The Statement of Policy was amended in 1974164 to allow
two new charts portraying fund performance to be included in mutual
fund sales literature."' 5
Sample Chart E, by the use of a mountain graph, presents "a continu-
ous record of the results of an investment" over a ten-year period. 6
Along with the mutual fund's record, the chart must include a market
index 167 "to demonstrate the effect of fluctuations in the securities
markets on fund investment results." 168  Sample Chart F displays the
same data as Sample Chart E, but uses a bar graph format to emphasize
annual variations in the rate of investment return. 16 9
Whether this liberalization in advertising will enable funds to cultivate
a demand for mutual fund shares'"1 and thus reduce the costs of
162. Securities Act §§ 11, 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77q(a) (1970).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 7.7j(b) (1970), and
SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), are also applicable, if "in connection
with [a] purchase or sale .... "
163. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 1503 (Aug. 11, 1950). The
Statement of Policy is based on the premise that any implication that an investor will
receive a return on his investment is misleading, and thus illegal unless expressly
permitted. Any portrayal of past performance, because it must of necessity either
summarize or be confusing, and because it implies a continuation of past trends, falls
into the same category. The amended Statement of Policy expressly permits the use of
charts based on the "text, graphic detail and arrangement" of certain "sample charts."
SEC Statement of Policy § (j) (1) (i), in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5537, 5 S.E.C.
Dock. 390, 393 (1974).
164. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5537, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 390 (1974). See SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 7475 (Nov. 3, 1972) (amendment proposed).
165. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5537, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 390, 391-92 (1974).
166. Id. at 391. The use of a uniform period is intended "to promote comparison,"
and to "minimize the possibility of distortion" because of the selection of a more
favorable period. Id.
167. The Standard & Poor's Composite Index of 500 Stocks was selected, and must be
used by all funds. Id. at 391, 392 n.2. Footnote 3 of Chart E explains to investors the
purpose of the market index. Id. at 398-99.
168. Id. at 391, 392 n.2.
169. Id. at 392:
Presentation of annual variations in the fund's return should assist investors
in distinguishing the average [variable] rate of return for a mutual fund . ..
from the constant return available from a savings account. ...
170. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text (repeal of § 22(d) must be
preceded by development of demand "pull").
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distribution remains to be seen. The advertising liberalization of
1972171 appears to have been little help to the industry. 172  The 1974
liberalizations, however, permit the inclusion of information about par-
ticular funds 1 73 thus giving each fund an incentive to engage in more
extensive advertising. 74
B. Group Purchases
Although section 22(d) speaks of "a .. . price,"'7 5 the SEC has
always permitted discounted sales loads on large purchases if the dis-
count was described in the prospectus and equally available to all
investors. 176 An investor qualifies for quantity discounts if his purchase
exceeds a given quantity (a "breakpoint'), typically set by the fund
between $10,000 and $25,000.177 Since the discounted sales load
applies to the entire purchase, some larger purchases include a far
smaller sales cost than smaller purchases.' 7 8
171. See note 148 supra.
172. The value of the assets of active mutual funds declined from $64.7 billion in
mid-1972, 38 SEC ANN. REP. 152 (1972), to $54.4 billion in mid-1973, 39 SEC ANN.
REP. 149 (1973), to $46.1 billion in mid-1974, 40 SEC ANN. REP. 153 (1974).
Although part of this decline in assets is attributable to a decline in the stock market, the
mutual industry believes itself less susceptible to such declines than the market in general.
Furthermore, funds also experienced a decrease in the number of investors. 1974 RE-
PORT 21-22.
173. See notes 151-56 supra and accompanying text.
174. The 1972 advertising liberalization was directed toward educating the public
about mutual funds in general, see note 148 supra. To justify advertising, a fund had to
conclude that encouraging investors to select some mutual fund would yield a sufficient
increase in purchases of the particular fund to cover the expense. The 1974 liberaliza-
tion, however, since it permits advertising about the particular fund, may be more
acceptable to funds.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970).
176. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 89 (Mar. 13, 1941) (Opinion of
SEC General Counsel). The fact pattern that prompted the opinion included a specified
load on purchases up to $25,000 and a discount, at the option of the underwriter, on
larger sales. The opinion stated that, although the discretion delegated to the underwri-
ter could result in discrimination between inside and public purchasers and was therefore
prohibited by § 22(d), the variation in load for larger purchases was permissible so long
as it was available to all purchasers on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. See 1 L. Loss,
SEcurrUs REGuLATON 406 (2d ed. 1961); Greene, supra note 3, at 375-76.
177. 1974 REPORT 90; 1972 STUDY, supra note 10, at 101-03. Approximately half of
the funds have $10,000 as their first breakpoint. Subsequent breakpoints entitle purchas-
ers to greater discounts in the sales load. Id. at 101.
178. 1972 STUDy 83 n.l:
[Under the typical mutual fund sales charge schedule a $9,500 purchase
would bear a sales load of $807.50, while the sales load on a $10,000 purchase
would be $750.00 and on a $10,500 purchase, $787.50.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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Groups often aggregate the purchases of their individual members to
qualify for quantity discounts. To be eligible to do so, a group must
qualify as a "person" within the meaning of section 22(d).179  If the
group is not a "person," the SEC will look beyond the group to the
individual investors. Since the individuals' purchases would not qualify
for the quantity discount, a reduced sales load would be an illegal
deviation from the uniform public offering price required by section
22(d).180
The Investment Company Act contains few restrictions on "group-
ing." Section 2(a)(28) and 2(a)(8) 181 define "person" broadly.
Under these definitions, groups formed for the sole purpose of aggregat-
ing purchases could qualify for discounts.' 82
In 1958, in response to industry pressure, 183 the SEC restricted the
eligibility of groups for quantity discounts by promulgating rule 22d-
1.184 Paragraph (a) of the rule contained a specific "antigrouping"
provision which prohibited quantity discounts to groups "of individuals
whose funds are combined, directly or indirectly, for the purpose" of
mutual fund shares. 8 5 By defining "person," as used in section 22(d),
more narrowly than the Investment Company Act, the SEC satisfied
industry objections but restricted the use of an important and efficient
technique of mass marketing. 186
179. 1974 REPORT 89. See SEC Rule 22d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-l(a) (1971).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). See note 2 supra.
181. Section 22(d) requires a uniform price for sales to "any person." 15 U.S.C. §
80a-22(d) (1970). The Investment Company Act defines "person" as "a natural person
or a company," 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (28) (1970), and defines "company" as
a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, a
fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not; or any
receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or similar official or any liquidating agent for
any of the foregoing, in his capacity as such.
Investment Company Act § 2(a) (8), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (8) (1970).
182. Greene 379; Simpson & Hodes, supra note 3, at 720-21. In some instances,
dealers and salesmen encouraged the formation of groups. 1 L. Loss, SEcTnrnns
REGULATION 407 (2d ed. 1961); Greene 379.
183. Greene 379. Competition between funds to organize and offer discounts to
groups threatened the industry's desire to avoid price-cutting. SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958). See Hodes, supra note 27, at 1064.
184. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958) (adopted);
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2718 (May 29, 1958) (proposed). See 1 L.
Loss, SEcuRrnES REGULATION 406-07 (2d ed. 1961).
185. SEC Rule 22d-1(a) (3), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1 (a) (3) (1971).
186. 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 92.
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The SEC has recently amended rule 22d-1 to permit funds, at their
option, 87 to either offer discounts only to those groups that qualify as a
"person" under the old paragraph (a), or to elect the expanded eligibili-
ty provisions of new paragraph (b) which permits quantity discounts to
any "purchaser."' s8 The term "purchaser" includes all individuals and
families; 8 9 al groups eligible under paragraph (a);100 and all groups
that (1) have been in existence for six months, 191 (2) have a purpose
other than the aggregation of purchases for discount, 9 2 and (3) are
able to satisfy uniform criteria, relating to economies of scale, estab-
lished by the fund.193
The mutual fund industry generally opposed the expansion of group
187. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 420
(1974). By giving funds the option of retaining the old restriction or taking advantage
of the expanded definition, the SEC hopes to encourage a degree of voluntary competi-
tion and to cushion any adverse impact on specific dealers. tSee 1974 REPORT 90 n.2.
188. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 420
(1974).
189. Id. See Greene 376-77 (family purchase always viewed as "single transaction").
190. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 421
(1974).
191. Id.
192. The requirement that groups have a "purpose other than to purchase redeemable
securities of a registered investment company at a discount," SEC Rule 22d-
1 (b) (3) (ii) (B), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22(d)-1 (b) (3) (ii) (B) (1975), is more than a vestige
of the anti-grouping provision enacted in 1958. See notes 183-85 supra. It is a
compromise intended to allay industry fears that "the broad availability of relatively low
group prices might discourage retailers from making an effort to sell fund shares on an
individual basis." 1974 REPORT 90. The strongest objections of the industry had been
aimed at discounts to groups with no "unrelated purpose." See Hodes 1065 ("ad hoc
buying cooperatives"); Ratner, Regulation of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 348, 380 n.192 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ratner].
Consistent with this rationale, the rule further restricts eligibility by expressly exclud-
ing four groups having a weak organizational nexus:
[T]he term "purchaser" shall not include any group of individuals whose sole
organizational nexus is that the participants are credit cardholders of a com-
pany; policyholders of an insurance company; customers of either a bank or
broker-dealer; or clients of an investment adviser.
SEC Rule 22d-1(b)(3)(ii)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-l(b)(3)(i)(C) (1975). The SEC
noted, however, that "Et]his listing may be narrowed or expanded by further amendment
to the rule if experience shows that it would be appropriate." SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 420 (1974).
193. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420 (1974).
Other than the reduced sales effort generally supposed to accompany group sales, the
SEC gave as an example "the payment by the purchaser of record-keeping and other
administrative charges .... ." Id. Funds may also find it possible to institute "cost-
saving modifications" in "paperwork procedures." 1974 REPORT 90 n.1; see SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 8514, 7 S.E.C. Dock. 201 (1974).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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Groups often aggregate the purchases of their individual members to
qualify for quantity discounts. To be eligible to do so, a group must
qualify as a "person" within the meaning of section 22(d).179  If the
group is not a "person," the SEC will look beyond the group to the
individual investors. Since the individuals' purchases would not qualify
for the quantity discount, a reduced sales load would be an illegal
deviation from the uniform public offering price required by section
22(d).180
The Investment Company Act contains few restrictions on "group-
ing." Section 2(a)(28) and 2(a)(8) 18' define "person" broadly.
Under these definitions, groups formed for the sole purpose of aggregat-
ing purchases could qualify for discounts. 182
In 1958, in response to industry pressure, 18 3 the SEC restricted the
eligibility of groups for quantity discounts by promulgating rule 22d-
1.184 Paragraph (a) of the rule contained a specific "antigrouping"
provision which prohibited quantity discounts to groups "of individuals
whose funds are combined, directly or indirectly, for the purpose" of
mutual fund shares. 18 5 By defining "person," as used in section 22(d),
more narrowly than the Investment Company Act, the SEC satisfied
industry objections but restricted the use of an important and efficient
technique of mass marketing. 8 6
179. 1974 REPORT 89. See SEC Rule 22d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-l(a) (1971).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). See note 2 supra.
181. Section 22(d) requires a uniform price for sales to "any person." 15 U.S.C. §
80a-22(d) (1970). The Investment Company Act defines "person" as "a natural person
or a company," 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (28) (1970), and defines "company" as
a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, a
fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not; or any
receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or similar official or any liquidating agent for
any of the foregoing, in his capacity as such.
Investment Company Act § 2(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (8) (1970).
182. Greene 379; Simpson & Hodes, supra note 3, at 720-21. In some instances,
dealers and salesmen encouraged the formation of groups. 1 L. Loss, SEcupmns
REGULATION 407 (2d ed. 1961); Greene 379.
183. Greene 379. Competition between funds to organize and offer discounts to
groups threatened the industry's desire to avoid price-cutting. SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958). See Hodes, supra note 27, at 1064.
184. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958) (adopted);
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2718 (May 29, 1958) (proposed). See 1 L.
Loss, SEcuRrmIs REGULATION 406-07 (2d ed. 1961).
185. SEC Rule 22d-l(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1(a) (3) (1971).
186. 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 92.
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The SEC has recently amended rule 22d-1 to permit funds, at their
option, 8 7 to either offer discounts only to those groups that qualify as a
"person" under the old paragraph (a), or to elect the expanded eligibili-
ty provisions of new paragraph (b) which permits quantity discounts to
any "purchaser."' s8 The term "purchaser" includes all individuals and
families;'89 all groups eligible under paragraph (a);190 and all groups
that (1) have been in existence for six months, 191 (2) have a purpose
other than the aggregation of purchases for discount,192 and (3) are
able to satisfy uniform criteria, relating to economies of scale, estab-
lished by the fund.93
The mutual fund industry generally opposed the expansion of group
187. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 420
(1974). By giving funds the option of retaining the old restriction or taking advantage
of the expanded definition, the SEC hopes to encourage a degree of voluntary competi-
tion and to cushion any adverse impact on specific dealers. See 1974 REPORT 90 n.2.
188. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 420
(1974).
189. Id. See Greene 376-77 (family purchase always viewed as "single transaction").
190. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 421
(1974).
191. Id.
192. The requirement that groups have a "purpose other than to purchase redeemable
securities of a registered investment company at a discount," SEC Rule 22d-
1 (b) (3) (ii) (B), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22(d)-1 (b) (3) (ii) (B) (1975), is more than a vestige
of the anti-grouping provision enacted in 1958. See notes 183-85 supra. It is a
compromise intended to allay industry fears that "the broad availability of relatively low
group prices might discourage retailers from making an effort to sell fund shares on an
individual basis." 1974 REPORT 90. The strongest objections of the industry had been
aimed at discounts to groups with no "unrelated purpose." See Hodes 1065 ("ad hoc
buying cooperatives"); Ratner, Regulation of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 348, 380 n.192 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ratner].
Consistent with this rationale, the rule further restricts eligibility by expressly exclud-
ing four groups having a weak organizational nexus:
[T]he term "purchaser" shall not include any group of individuals whose sole
organizational nexus is that the participants are credit cardholders of a com-
pany; policyholders of an insurance company; customers of either a bank or
broker-dealer; or clients of an investment adviser.
SEC Rule 22d-1 (b) (3) (ii) (C), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1 (b) (3) (ii) (C) (1975). The SEC
noted, however, that "jt]his listing may be narrowed or expanded by further amendment
to the rule if experience shows that it would be appropriate." SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 420 (1974).
193. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420 (1974).
Other than the reduced sales effort generally supposed to accompany group sales, the
SEC gave as an example "the payment by the purchaser of record-keeping and other
administrative charges .... ." Id. Funds may also find it possible to institute "cost-
saving modifications" in "paperwork procedures." 1974 REPORT 90 n.l; see SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 8514, 7 S.E.C. Dock. 201 (1974).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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eligibility. 19 4  The 1974 Report, which recommended the expansion,
noted:
Members of the industry cite problems of suitability, discrimination,
and "disorderly distribution." However, we believe that the core of
the industry's objections is a fear that the broad availability of rela-
tively low group prices might discourage retailers from making an effort
to sell fund shares on an individual basis.195
Furthermore, the industry noted, although investors would receive a
discount, extensive group purchasing would require them to sacrifice
some or all individual investment advice.196
As adopted, the eligibility provisions and their optional nature clearly
are a compromise intended to take into account the objections raised.
Even though it is a compromise, however, the amendment will not
diminish present suitability requirements.' 97 Yet, these requirements
do not "necessarily include an obligation on sellers . . . to assure that
individual purchasers make use of all group purchase opportunities."' 98
194. 1974 REPoRT 90.
195. Id. But see note 192 supra (requirement of unrelated purposes).
196. The SEC has presumed that any investor "who feels he needs individual services
• ..would not buy through a group." 1974 REPoRT 91. The group, however, must
have a purpose not related to investment, see note 192 supra, for which the individuat
probably joined the group. Limiting the qualifications of the group will not achieve the
desired investor protection. Rather, it must be achieved by "full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold . . . ." Securities Act, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
197. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 421
(1974). Generally stated, the suitability doctrine is "an obligation on the part of the
dealer to recommend only securities that are suitable to the needs of the particular
customer." 6 L. Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATION 3708 (Supp. 1969). The doctrine
was directed against "the evils of high pressure selling." Id. See Best Securities,
Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 933 (1960) ("intensive campaign of selling"). The doctrine was
incorporated into the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. m, § 2, and in more limited
form in SEC Rule 15c2-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1975) (governing sales of "equity
funding programs"). See generally Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-
The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. REv. 233 (1966); Jacobs, The Impact of Securi-
ties Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CONELL L. REv. 869, 897-905
(1972); Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability
Doctrine, 1965 DuKE LJ. 445; Note, A Symptomatic Approach to Securities Fraud: The
SEC's Proposed Rule 15c2-6 and the Boiler Room, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963). The suit-
ability requirement raises two problems when mutual fund shares are sold at a discount
to members of a group. See notes 198-99 infra.
198. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420, 421
(1974). Industry members were concerned that the suitability requirement would
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Moreover, rule 22d-1 speaks of sales -to a "purchaser" (the group)
rather than sales to the members of the group. Based upon the language
of this rule, it is consistent to extend the seller's suitability obligation only
to the "purchaser." 199  Since rule 22d-1 still limits eligibility to "bona
fide" groups, there should be no disruption of the distribution
process.10 Those funds that experience a disturbing decline in sales to
individuals may simply choose to eliminate the discounts granted to
groups that do not qualify under the more restrictive paragraph (a).20 1
The expansion of group eligibility, tied to actual economies of scale202
and affecting only those funds that opt to use it, is a reasonable ap-
proach. Calling the expansion an "experiment," 203 the SEC nonethe-
less has indicated that "[i]n the future . . . it may be appropriate to
provide quantity discounts to any group .. ,204 Although it ac-
knowledged some disclosure and suitability problems inherent in group
sales, 05 the SEC concluded that "in the long run, this [expansion of
require them to ascertain if a purchaser, proposing to buy individually, would be eligible
to participate in a group purchase. Such a duty would have benefited investors by in-
creasing the use of quantity discounts, but would have hindered dealers by requiring
additional work and decreasing the resulting sales revenues.
The Release, however, did not completely waive the requirement that sellers advise
purchasers of group purchase opportunities; it said only that dealers need not "assure that
individual purchasers make use of all group purchase opportunities." Id. (emphasis
added). In some instances, dealers may still be obliged to recommend that an individual
purchase through a group.
199. In the group purchase context, it is unclear whether the seller may simply
determine that the recommended fund is a suitable investment for the group, rather than
assessing the investment needs of each individual. Neither the 1974 Report nor SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 420 (1974), considered this
problem. Article III, § 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice speaks of an obligation to
ensure the suitability of securities recommended "to a customer." SEC Rule 15c2-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1975), speaks of sales to a "person." If "customer" and "person"
mean "group," then dealers need only assess the investment situation of the group.
This interpretation of the suitability requirements seems reasonable. The discount for
group purchases is premised on the notion that the group functions as a purchasing
entity. In addition, the SEC has encouraged group sales because they are a mass
marketing technique that reduces selling costs. To require dealers to ensure the
suitability of the investment for each individual would severely reduce the usefulness of
this sales technique.
200. 1974 RPoRT 90.
201. Id. at 90 n.2.
202. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
203. 1974 REPORT 90. See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8659, 5
S.E.C. Dock. 420 (1974) (list may be narrowed or expanded).
204. 1974 R!PoRT91 n.1.
205. Id. at 90.
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eligibility] should result in wider, more economical and efficient distri-
bution of mutual fund shares. 2 °6
C. Regulation of the Level of Sales Loads
The SEC views the high level of sales loads as an unnecessary cost
to investors 207 and fears that the disproportionately high compensa-
tion will influence broker-dealers to recommend mutual fund shares
rather than other investments .208 Accordingly, the SEC has sought the
authority to reduce sales loads.20 9 Before 1970, section 22(b) 210 grant-
ed the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) authority,
with SEC supervision, to prohibit only "unconscionable or grossly exces-
sive" sales loads.2 1' This language, the NASD and SEC believed,
effectively put most high sales loads beyond the reach of any regula-
tion. 12 In 1966, the SEC urged Congress to place a five percent maxi-
206. Id. at 92.
207. Id. at 82. See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969):
Mutual fund sales charges are much higher than .. . elsewhere in the se-
curities industry. The basic New York Stock Exchange commission is about
I percent. . . . Over-the-counter securities transactions, when executed on an
agency basis, are the same as stock exchange commissions. When the dealer
acts as principal the commission is usually between 2 and 3 percent ....
208. Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at ii. See Survey 833 ("Wearing as he does the
two hats of investor adviser and breadwinner, the potential for conflicts of interest is
clear").
The debate over the high level of mutual fund sales loads should not be confused with
the debate over the need for competition in the industry. The first is primarily a
question of statistics, the second an issue of public policy. Nor should it be supposed
that the repeal of § 22(d) in itself will necessarily reduce sales loads. See 1972 STUDY,
supra note 10, at vi. Further, placing a price ceiling on sales loads may have the effect
of dampening competition. But see notes 232-34 infra and accompanying text.
209. As an outgrowth of the 1966 REPORT, supra note 77, the SEC proposed that §
22(b) be amended to provide a five percent maximum sales load, with SEC authority to
alter the sales load if conditions required. 1966 REPORT 223. The proposal was
incorporated into S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1967), as originally drafted. The
proposed maximum was vigorously challenged by the industry, deleted, and replaced.
For a review of SEC efforts to have § 22(b) amended, see North, The Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970, 46 NonTn DAmE LAw. 712 (1971); North, supra
note 106. See also Survey, supra note 3, at 844-48.
210. Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, § 22(b), 54 Stat. 823.
211. "[The price at which such security is offered or sold to the public shall not
include an unconscionable or grossly excessive sales load". -Id. (emphasis added).
212. 1974 REPORT 4; 1966 REPORT 218. The congressional deliberations also evince
a belief that the pre-1970 statutory standard was insufficiently stringent. See S. RP.
No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969) (emphasis added):
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mum on sales loads.213  Congress, however, declined, and instead
amended section 22(b) in 1970 to allow the NASD to prohibit "exces-
sive' sales loads.214 To prevent unreasonable limitation, the seotion as
amended also provides that mutual fund distributors should be allowed
"reasonable compensation."215
Whether the amendment of section 22(b) was a prerequisite to
regulation of the high level of sales loads is open to question.2 10 Never-
theless, the NASD and SEC felt restrained by the more permissive
"unconscionable or grossly excessive" standard, and they interpret-
ed the 1970 amendment as a mandate to reduce sales loads through
more restrictive regulation.21 7
This committee believes there is a need to improve the protections afforded
mutual fund investors in the sales commission area since existing regulatory
controls provide only for the prohibition of unconscionable or grossly excessive
sales loads.
See also Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 174 (1967).
213. Hearings on S. 34 and S. 296 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 18-19, 29 (1969).
214. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1422, amending 15
U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1964). The relevant part of the section, as amended, provides:
[The price at which such security is offered or sold to the public shall not
include an excessive sales load but shall allow for reasonable compensation for
sales personnel, broker-dealers, and underwriters, and for reasonable sales loads
to investors.
Investment Company Act § 22(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b)(1) (1970). See generally
H.R. REP. No. 1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970) (conference report); H.R. REP. No.
1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 17-18
(1969); Manges, The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 26 Bus. LAw.
1311 (1971); North, The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 712 (1971).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1) (1970). As introduced in the House, H.R. 14737,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), provided that sales personnel should have "reasonable
compensation . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). The
conference committee agreed to follow the Senate version, and also adopted a House
provision that gave the SEC authority to exempt smaller companies. H.R. REP. No.
1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970) (conference report). This "smaller companies"
provision is now the last sentence of § 22(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b)(1) (1970).
216. Although the wording of the standards is admittedly different, and the old
standard connotes a higher permissible sales load, this difference is arguably semantic.
But see Survey 840:
The assumption under which the SEC operates in this regard is that Congress
has itself stated what an unconscionable sales load is. In section 27(a)(1)
[15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a)(1) (1970)], the Seventy-sixth Congress provided that
loads on sales of contractual plans could not exceed nine per cent of the of-
fering price.
217. 1974 REPORT 122.
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Pursuant to this perception of increased authority, the NASD adopt-
ed218 and the SEC approved219 a rule setting a variable maximum on
sales loads. A maximum load of 8.5 percent may be charged only by
those funds providing three discount opportunities in their price
structure: dividend reinvestment at no load, 220 rights of accumula-
tion,22I and quantity discounts.22 2
The rule assigns each discount opportunity a percentage value (a
"penalty") by which the maximum permissible load is reduced if the
variation is not offered. 2 3  Since each of the price variations eliminates
an opportunity for the underwriter and retailer to receive a commission,
the rule allows a higher load to be charged when income-reducing
variations are offered. As the NASD explained,
[The] penalties are intended to correct the imperfections which the
NASD perceived in the mutual fund pricing structure in order that it
218. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11593, 7 S.E.C. Dock. 570 (1975).
In its letter filing the proposed rule, the NASD stated:
The purpose of the amendments is to establish a structure of maximum sales
charges which will give effect to . . . the amount of the purchase and special
investor privileges of benefits associated with a particular mutual fund ....
The [NASD] believes that the [rule is] necessary ... to implement the provi-
sions of Section 22(b) of the Investment Company Act [as amended].
id. at 572, quoting Letter from NASD to SEC proposing amendment of NASD Rules of
Fair Practice, Art. III, § 26 (July 16, 1975).
219. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11725, 8 S.E.C. Dock. 66 (1975).
The rule amended NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, §§ 26, 29.
220. The reinvestment of dividends resembles a savings account from which interest
payments are not withdrawn; the interest becomes part of the principal and itself begins
to draw interest. The imposition of sales loads on the reinvestment of dividends has
been called an "anomolous practice," 1966 REPORT 223, because the reinvestment of
dividends involves no sales effort which would justify the load. The SEC termed the
practice "one of the more flagrant deficiencies of the present load structure . . . ." 1974
REPORT 127. Not all funds charge a sales load on reinvestment, however, and one fund
sought and was granted permission to allow its investors to reinvest dividends at no load
in any of seven funds managed by a common adviser-underwriter. SEC Investment
Company Act Release No. 9003, 8 S.E.C. Dock. 308 (1975). See also SEC Investment
Company Act Release No. 9048, 8 S.E.C. Dock. 574 (1975) (exemption requested).
221. A fund that offers rights to accumulation gives an investor a quantity discount
when the value of his current holdings in the fund, including his immediate purchase,
total more than a breakpoint in the sales load scale. 1974 REPORT 123. Funds that do
not offer rights of accumulation give a quantity discount only when the amount of a
single purchase exceeds a breakpoint.
222. See notes 175-206 supra and accompanying text. The rule allows funds to select
$10,000 or $15,000 as their first breakpoint.
223. Data collected by Booz, Allen & Hamilton for the NASD provided the basis for
the valuation of these variations. NASD, AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE DiSTRIBUTnON OF
MUTUAL FuNDS AND VARIABLE ANN=u s (1974) [hereinafter cited as NASD STUDY].
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correspond more fully to a pricing structure which would exist under
a system of effective competition. 224
The 1974 Report argued that a fourth variation, an exchange privi-
lege, should also be required of funds charging the maximum sales
load. 225  This privilege allows investors to exchange shares of one fund
for the equivalent value of shares of another fund without payment of a
sales load. 2 6  Approximately 90 percent of the industry now offers
some exchange privilege, almost always between funds managed by the
same adviser-underwriter.227 The NASD omitted exchange privileges
because of the burden it would place on that 10 percent of the industry
composed of "single-fund underwriters," who manage no other fund
with which they could offer an exchange without loss of assets.2 2
The 1974 Report, however, argued that the value of the privilege to
investors overrode the potential hardship to these few underwriters. 229
Further, the 1974 Report noted that the privilege deprives distributors
of an alternative source of income. Since fund distributors who offer
an exchange privilege receive no compensation on exchanges, they
should be permitted to charge a higher initial sales charge,230 a result
identical to that which a competitive price structure would produce.
Such an addition to the rule would be consistent with the policy of
regulating sales loads in order to make them "correspond more fully to
a pricing structure which would exist under a system of effective com-
petition. ' 31
The SEC views the NASD rule as only "an interim measure which
adds some rationality to the sales load structure. 23 2 Although the rule
functions by imposing a ceiling on prices, the ceiling resembles a com-
petitive pricing structure and is intended to establish the preconditions
224. 1974 RIEPORT, supra note 12, at 123.
225. Id. 128-29.
226. Section 11 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-ll (1970), per-
mits such exchanges.
227. 1974 REPORT 128, citing NASD STuDY, pt. 3, at 32.
228. 1974 REPORT 128. Although the requirement that funds offer an exchange
privilege could be viewed as favoring advisers who manage more than one fund, the 1974
Report noted that "single fund underwriters might be able to avoid penalties by arranging
exchange privileges with another [fund] complex . . . ." Id. The Report gave no
consideration to the view that this 10 percent of the industry contains a significant
number of companies which, in a competitive market, might offer increased competition.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 123.
232. Id. at 127.
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necessary for effective price competition.23 The SEC believes it "more
important in the long run to attempt to establish greater opportunities
for competition than to impose a more restrictive regulatory pattern.
234
Thus, the introduction of more detailed price regulation is merely a
means to introduce competitive characteristics into the pricing structure
and is not inconsistent with the overall policy of developing a competi-
tive environment.
If other competitive variations are introduced, and if investors become
more sensitive to differences in sales loads, normal market forces may
begin to exert the downward pressures on prices that the rule is intended
to supply.23 5  At that point, prescribed maximum sales loads may be
replaced by a prohibition of "excessive" sales loads. 3 6 Although such a
rule will be sufficient after the introduction of competitive market forces
is complete, the certainty of a "definite ceiling"237 is necessary during
the present period of regulatory modification. The rule, as an interim
measure, appears to be the best way to reconcile the competing needs of
investors and the industry until a more competitive environment is
established.
D. Unsolicited Purchases
At first glance, it seems unreasonable to impose a full sales load on
purchases by an unadvised and unsolicited investor, because the retailer
incurs no cost in securing the purchase. This argument, however, ig-
nores the possibility that an investor might receive advice from one
dealer, then purchase through another dealer, and thus appear to be
an unsolicited investor.23 The 1974 Report concluded that
the likelihood that dealers could be deprived of compensation for their
services, and that fund distribution might thus be impaired, outweighs
233. Id. at 82. Given this purpose for the maximum sales load rule, the SEC could
be expected to argue for additional variations in the future. Beyond the argument
involving exchange privileges, however, there has been no indication that the SEC will
do so.
234. Id. at 125.
235. Whether investors will develop the sensitivity to price variations that the SEC
expects is open to doubt. See id. at 19 (price inelasticity is still a key characteristic of
mutual fund merchandising).
236. Id. at 127.
237. See id.
238. ld. at 93-94.
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the argument in favor of providing price reductions for genuinely un-
solicited new investors. 23 9
Although it was unable to formulate a workable rule that would permit
unsolicited new investors to receive discounts "reflecting the absence of
selling efforts with respect to their purchases,' ' 240 the SEC did indicate a
willingness to consider exemptions from seotion 22(d) if a fund was
able to design a program that dealt with the practical difficulties of
identifying genuinely unsolicited new investors.24'
The unsolicited "repeat" investor can be, and has been, distinguished
from the unsolicited new investor. 42 The SEC has formulated what it
believes to be a manageable rule243 to "allow underwriters [at their
option] to provide for periodic 'open seasons,' ,244 during which the
sales load charged to repeat investors may be reduced. The rule reflects
a balance between the desire to eliminate unjustified loads paid by
repeat investors, and the danger of discouraging followup sales by
depriving dealers of commissions on those sales.2 4r The opportunity to
purchase "open season" shares must (1) be limited to purchasers who
are holders of record "for at least a specified period," probably one
year; 246 (2) allow each investor to purchase only "an amount not in
excess of the amount of shares already owned," 247 (3) be disclosed
through notice to shareholders and a description of the process in the
prospectus;2 48 and (4) not entail suspension of regular selling efforts.24 0
239. Id.. at 96.
240. Id. at 93.
241. Id. at 97.
242. Id. at 93-94.
243. Id. at 94. The SEC is particularly conscious of the possibility that its modifica-
tions in regulation may discourage sales, compounding the problem of extended net
redemptions the industry has recently experienced. See note 172 supra. "A salesman
who has no opportunity for additional commissions from follow-up sales may decide that
the 'one-shot' earnings from an initial sale do not justify an extensive effort." 1974
REPORT 94. The SEC concluded, however, that the discouragement would be "minimal"
because "sales loads are high enough to provide salesmen with reasonable compensation
for each sale." Id. at 94-95.
244. 1974 REPORT 94. The SEC intended that the choice given to the adviser-
underwriter would cushion any adverse impact that "open seasons" might have, and
would introduce another variation into the mutual fund pricing structure. Id.
245. Id. at 94.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 95. Should experience show that a limitation is unnecessary, the SEC
may delete the limitation from the rule. Funds will still probably be permitted to set a
maximum at their discretion. Id. at 95 n.1.
248. Id. at 95. The "open season" rule was formulated as an exemption to § 22(d).
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As described in the 1974 Report, the "open season" is similar to the
privilege of reinvesting dividends at no load, because the retailer ex-
pends no sales effort to secure either purchase.250
The rule arguably has one shortcoming; it does not include a provi-
sion for underwriters who may wish to compensate retailers for the
deprivation of an opportunity to make followup sales. The 1974
Report reasoned that
if salesmen receive enough compensation from a sale, it should not be
necessary to offer the salesman the prospect of additional unrelated and
perhaps unearned compensation from future purchases by the cus-
tomer. 251
While such reasoning is consistent with the SEC's desire to encourage
mass marketing techniques,2 52 commissions from followup sales may be
a major source of compensation for fund sales organizations. Experi-
ence with "open seasons" may show that the deprivation is not apprecia-
ble, or that the opportunity to participate in "open seasons" is sufficiently
limited to protect the salesman's legitimate interest in followup sales.
E. Combination Sales
Mutual fund retailers often sell a wide variety of competing financial
products along with mutual fund shares.153  Since the commissions
from competing products may pay a portion of the cost of mutual fund
distribution,254 the 1974 Report concluded that it would be "desirable to
recognize such cost savings and allow fund distributors to pass them
along to investors. 255
The requirement that the reduction be stated in the prospectus, however, would permit
the argument that it is a "public offering price described in the prospectus" as required
by § 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970).
249. 1974 REPORT 96 n.l.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 95.
252. Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at iv. See 1974 REPORT 11.
253. 1974 REPORT 23-26. These products include insurance, real estate investment
trusts, fixed annuities, discretionary accounts, and cash management plans. Id.
254. Id. at 97:
A considerable portion of the sales charge . . .covers the cost of initially
soliciting the customer . . . and counseling him .... [I]f a retailer sells
* * .to an investor to whom he has previously or contemporaneously sold some
other financial product .... much of the necessary solicitation and financial
counseling will already have taken place and need not be repeated ....
255. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Acknowledging its lack of experience in regulating combination pur-
chases,2 50 the SEC declined to propose a comprehensive rule. Instead,
the SEC indicated its willingness to consider exemptions from section
22(d)
where the investor (1) previously or contemporaneously purchased
(2) from the same retailer (3) certain other types of investment prod-
ucts ... (4) which are available at a separately stated price, and which
are (5) distributed by the same underwriter or a company affiliated
with such underwriter.257
The administrative problems inherent in granting discounts on combi-
nation sales are great. If the competing product is insurance, extensive
state regulation may be encountered. Products that are insufficiently
separated may create problems of "tie-in" sales.258 Nonetheless, the
new approach has the potential for passing actual savings to investors,
providing distributors the opportunity to experiment with new distribu-
tion strategies, and tying the distribution of mutual funds to more
equitable and economical means.
F. Secondary Trading
At present, virtually all trading in mutual fund shares is accomplished
through the issuance of new shares and the redemption of outstanding
shares. Contractual restraints placed on broker-dealers by under-
writers259 and the uniform price requirement of section 22(d) 200 have
256. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8570, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 423, 424
(1974). See 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 93 & n.3.
257. Id. at 98-99. In announcing this policy, the SEC omitted the limitation on
the kinds of investment products, and the requirement that the products be available
separately. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8570, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 423, 424
(1974). It is doubtful that these omissions were for reasons other than brevity.
258. [A] tying arrangement may be described as an agreement to sell one prod-
uct but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or tied)
product ....
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
Because they tend to restrain competition for the tied product, tie-ins may violate § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrange-
ments Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958); 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 495,
497-98 & nn. 10-11. Unless the seller offers the tied product "on the condition" that the
buyer also purchase the tied product, there is no tie-in. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, supra, at 5. Thus, so long as the financial products in the package are also
available separately, as suggested by the 1974 Report, the tie-in problem will not arise.
259. 1974 REPORT 104.
260. The extent to which § 22(d) is responsible for the absence of secondary trading
is difficult to ascertain. Because the section arguably applied to secondary trading, it is
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hampered the development of a secondary market in which investors
could buy and sell shares through a broker acting as agent.
Secondary trading in mutual fund shares might take place in three
ways: a purchase and sale between two individuals; a transaction
arranged by an independent, or noncontract, broker-dealer; or a trans-
action arranged by a broker-dealer under contract to sell shares issued
by the fund. Exchanges between individuals are rare because of the
practical difficulties of a purchaser and seller locating each other.
Therefore, transactions arranged by contract and noncontract broker-
dealers are the only practical possibilities.
Retail dealers have consistently either refrained from brokering sec-
ondary transactions or charged a broker's fee on the secondary transac-
tion equal to the sales load required by their contracts with the funds'
underwriters. 61  Underwriters impose the first restriction to prevent
brokers from filling buy orders except with shares purchased through
the underwriter, thus guaranteeing the underwriter a commission on
every purchase of fund shares. The second restriction prevents the
broker-dealer from cutting prices to attract purchasers and sellers. 262
The Department of Justice recently brought suit263 alleging that, in
imposing these contractual restrictions, the NASD and members of the
mutual fund industry26 4 had violated federal antitrust law.265  The
likely that some broker-dealers concluded that § 22(d) prohibited them from brokering
transactions and therefore refrained.
261. 1974 REPORT 104.
262. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
263. In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1973).
The suit was a consolidation of the government action, United States v. NASD, Civil No.
338-73, and two private actions, Haddad v. Crosby Corp., Civil No. 2454-72, and Gross
v. NASD, Civil No. 426-73. After dismissal, the two private parties appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appeals were stayed pending
resolution of United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694 (1974). Gross filed a petition for
certiorari, which was denied, Gross v. NASD, 419 U.S. 843 (1974).
Fifty other private suits premised on similar theories were filed in other federal courts.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the suits consolidated in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 374 F. Supp. 95, 97 n.4 (D.D.C. 1974). The district court stayed all activity in the
cases. Id.
264. Other than the NASD, the suit involved three mutual funds, three underwriters,
and nine broker-dealers. 422 U.S. at 701 nn. 7-9.
265. The Department of Justice alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970) ("Every contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce. . . is.. . illegal"). As explained by the district court, 374 F. Supp. at 97,
the "gist of the complaint" was that defendants, through their sales contracts, inhibited
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district court dismissed the action,2 60 holding2 67 that the mutual fund
distribution system was immune from the antitrust laws. On expedited
appeal,268 the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal2 69 on different
grounds.2 70
the growth of a secondary market in fund shares, causing public purchasers to pay "arti-
ficial and non-competitive sales loads."
266. 374 F. Supp. at 114.
267. The district court based its holding on two alternative grounds. The court first
reasoned that
competition in the sale of a single fund's shares is effectively precluded by the
1940 Act which was intended, via § 22(d), to prevent the sale of fund shares
at a price less than that fixed in the current prospectus.
Id. at 108. The district court relied upon two arguments to support this ground for its
holding. First, the court found that § 22(d) was intended to prohibit the secondary
trading that defendants were accused of restraining, 374 F. Supp. at 106, citing Greene,
supra note 3, at 371. Compare notes 40-54 supra with notes 55-76 supra. Second, the
court noted that when Congress had considered repealing § 22(d), the SEC had offered
testimony which, as interpreted by the district court, indicated that § 22(d) pro-
hibited price cutting in the secondary trading market. Congress' acceptance of this
testimony, evidenced by Congress' declining to amend or repeal § 22(d), convinced the
court that Congress intended § 22(d) to apply to transactions in the secondary market.
374 F. Supp. at 106-07. To reach this ground for its holding, the district court rejected
the defendants' argument distinguishing "brokers" from "dealers." See notes 273-76
infra and accompanying text.
This broad holding, if affirmed, would have prohibited secondary trading by contract
and noncontract broker-dealers unless the public offering price, including the sales load
set by the underwriter, was maintained. It would also have prohibited any SEC action
introducing secondary trading at negotiated rates. The SEC found it necessary to take
issue with this holding when introducing its program to encourage the development of a
secondary market. See 1974 REPORT 104-05; notes 285-92 infra.
The district court's alternative ground for its holding, however, would not have
impinged on SEC regulatory control over secondary trading. Noting the "pervasive
regulatory scheme" established by the Investment Company Act, the district court found
a "Congressional intent to immunize the investment company industry from the impact
of the antitrust laws." 374 F. Supp. at 110. Because the Supreme Court ruled that it is
the "pervasive regulatory scheme" that shields mutual fund trading restrictions from
antitrust liability, the SEC clearly has the authority to modify that regulatory scheme to
make it more competitive.
268. Because the United States was complainant, and the case alleged violation of the
federal antitrust laws, the Expediting Act, ch. 646, § 17, 62 Stat. 989, required the
government to appeal directly to the Supreme Court. Because Gross and Crosby did not
involve the United States as complainant, appeal from the dismissal in those cases was to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
269. United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (5-4 decision), affirming In re
Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1973). The impact of
the decision on antitrust law is treated in Note. SEC Regulation as a Pervasive
Regulatory Scheme-Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws with Respect to National
Securities Exchanges and the NASD, 44 FoRD L. REV. 355 (1975).
270. The Court began its analysis by framing the issues:https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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The SEC, as amicus curiae, argued to the Supreme Court that section
22(d) is inapplicable to secondary trading. The section states that "no
dealer shall sell . . .except at a current offering price, '271 and the SEC
urged the Court to distinguish between "brokers" and "dealers. 2 72 The
Investment Company Act treats the terms separately, 73 defining a
broker as "any person . . .effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others," 274 and a dealer as "any person . . .buying and sell-
ing securities for his own account."- 5 Since a broker-dealer arranging
secondary transactions acts only as the agent of the buyer and seller,27
the SEC argued that the broker-dealer acts as a statutory "broker" and
therefore is not covered by the section 22(d) requirement. 27
The questions presented require us to determine whether § 22(d) obligates
appellees to engage in the [restriction of secondary trading] and thus neces-
sarily confers antitrust immunity for them. If not, we must determine whether
such practices are authorized by § 22(f) and, if so, whether they are immune
from antitrust sanction.
422 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
271. Investment Company Act § 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970), quoted in
note 2 supra.
272. The Investment Company Act § 2(a)(11) defines "dealer" as "any person
regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise . . . ." 15 U.S.C" § 80a-2(a)(11) (1970) (emphasis
added). A "broker" is "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others . . ." Investment Company Act § 2(a) (6), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(6) (1970) (emphasis added).
273. See 422 U.S. at 712 & n.22.
274. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (6) (1970).
275. Investment Company Act § 2(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(11) (1970).
276. mhe most apparent distinction between a broker and a dealer is that the
former effects transactions for the account of others and the latter buys and
sells securities for his own account. .. . [T]he terms of the Act [do not]
compel the conclusion that a broker-dealer acting in a brokerage capacity
would be bound by the § 22(d) dealer mandate.
422 U.S. at 713. The Department of Justice had argued that since the word "regularly"
appears in the definition of "dealer," see note 272 supra,
any person who purchases and sells securities with sufficient regularity to qual-
ify as a statutory dealer is thereafter bound by all dealer restrictions, regardless
of the nature of the particular transaction in question.
422 U.S. at 712-13. The Court, reasoning that "the critical distinction relates to their
transactional capacity," id. at 713, rejected this argument.
277. The SEC had adopted this interpretation well before the decision by the
Supreme Court. See 1974 REPORT 104 & n.3, citing Oxford Co., Inc., 21 S.E.C. 681
(1946), Investment Company Act Release No. 87 (March 14, 1941), Letter from Di-
rector, Division of Corporate Regulation, to Edward J. Esap (March 18, 1966), and
Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management Regulation, to George
A. Bailey, Jr. (April 24, 1973). The Supreme Court reasoned that the SEC interpreta-
tion was "entitled to considerable weight." United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 719
(1975).
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The Court accepted this argument, which the district court had reject-
ed,278 and thus found it necessary to rely upon the second holding of the
district court: 27 9  section 22(f)28 0 grants mutual funds the power to
restrict, and the SEC the power to regulate, the transferability of fund
shares. The Court held that section 22(f) established a "pervasive
regulatory scheme' 281 that immunized contractual restrictions on trans-
ferability from the antitrust laws.28 2 This rationale left the SEC, un-
hampered by section 22(d)283 or the antitrust laws, 28 4 to use its regula-
tory authority under section 22(f) to introduce secondary trading
gradually.
Even before the Supreme Court's decision, the 1974 Report recom-
mended the gradual elimination of restraints on brokered transac-
tions.28 5  The SEC, having decided that section 22(d) was inapplicable
278. 422 U.S. at 720. The district court clearly begged the question in stating: "This
argument, however, ignores the price maintenance purpose of § 22(d) .... ." 374
F. Supp. at 104.
279. 422 U.S. at 720.
280. Investment Company Act § 22(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970):
No registered open-end company shall restrict the transferability of any se-
curity of which it is the issuer except in conformity with the statements with
respect thereto contained in its registration statement nor in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ...
281. 422 U.S. at 735.
282. Here implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary to make the
[regulatory scheme] work." [W]e have implied immunity . . . to assure that
the federal agency entrusted with regulation. . . could carry out that respon-
sibility free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that might be voiced
by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.
Id. at 734, quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
283. Had the Court found § 22(d) applicable to secondary trading, no significant
amount of brokerage would have developed. The secondary market that existed before
1940 depended upon the broker's ability to purchase and sell shares at slightly better
prices than the fund offered, see note 47 supra. If § 22(d) required brokers to sell only
at the offering price set by the fund, they would have no way to attract the number of
purchasers needed to maintain a secondary market.
284. As recommended by the 1974 Report, the SEC wished to introduce secondary
trading gradually. 1974 REPORT 104-07. The contractual and transferability restrictions
would have been unenforceable if the Supreme Court had found the antitrust laws
applicable. This sudden establishment of secondary trading, the SEC feared, would have
disrupted the entire mutual fund distribution system. 1974 REPO T 105. As introduced,
the secondary market is subject to discretionary regulation by the SEC and NASD. See
notes 289-93 infra and accompanying text.
285. See 1974 REPORT 105-09 (elimination of restraints recommended); SEC Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 8570, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 423, 424-25 (1974) (intention to
eliminate restraints announced).
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to secondary trading,28 0 prompted the NASD to amend its Rules of Fair
Practice to prohibit such contractual restrictions.287 If funds attempt to
circumvent this prohibition by restricting the transferability of their
shares or imposing excessive transfer fees, the SEC will adopt a rule
under section 22(f) prohibiting such restrictions.288
The SEC will continue to regulate the brokered market in mutual
fund shares. The NASD rule allows funds to "impose a reasonable flat
service fee" upon the transfer of shares.289 The reasonableness of the
fee depends upon two factors: the cost of recording the transfer,29 °
and the sales load of which the underwriter is deprived through broker-
age rather than redemption and sale.2 1  Although the underwriter does
not participate in the brokered transaction, compensation for him is
allowed "to help ensure that all shareholders .. .bear a fair share of
mutual fund distribution costs. '2 -92  If secondary trading of a fund's
shares becomes "extensive," the rule allows the NASD to exempt the
fund from the prohibition on restrictive transfer fees.293
The SEC has admitted the difficulty of predicting the impact bro-
286. 1974 REPORT 104.
287. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8570, 5 S.E.C. Dock. 423, 424
(1974).
288. Section 22(f) prohibits funds from restricting "the transferability or negotiabili-
ty" of their shares "in contravention of" SEC rules. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970). See
1974 REPORT 105.
289. 1974 REPoRT 105-06. The NASD rule will probably both require funds to
calculate the fee as a percentage of the redemption value (net asset value) of the shares
traded, and limit the fee to a maximum of one percent. Cf. id. at 106 n.1.
290. Since transfer fees must not be so high that they discourage secondary trading,
the rule will probably require funds to show that the fee is related to costs actually
incurred. Id.
291. See id.
It may be argued that the services performed by the underwriters do not di-
rectly benefit investors who purchase shares from other individuals through a
broker. However, mutual fund offerings ...are continuous; therefore, per-
sons who buy and sell shares do benefit indirectly from the underwriter's
services . . . in that the underwriter helps to create the continuous demand
which is basic to the functioning of such a market .... [Ihey should help
pay the cost of such services.
292. Id. The "service fee" is intended "to help neutralize any adverse impact upon
the fund's primary distribution system, and to help ensure that transactions in a brokered
market do not injure existing shareholders." Id. at 105.
293. The 1974 Report recommended that the SEC permit funds to restrict the trans-
ferability of their shares
if the fund could show that such a market.., had become so extensive and
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kered transactions will have on the primary distribution system. 2 4 The
industry has argued that such a market will divert a substantial amount
of sales compensation from the distribution system, discouraging
new sales and resulting in net redemptions. 295  This fear of net redemp-
tions fails to recognize that shares involved in brokered transactions are
not redeemed, but remain outstanding. Although sales may decrease,
redemptions should decrease at a commensurate rate.29  Further,
the decrease in sales load revenues should be balanced by lowered
distribution costs, 297 the transfer fee paid to 'the underwriter, 208 and the
reduced need for distribution.29 9  The development is a sound one and
should be welcomed by investors as a long overdue reform.
G. Broker's Fees for Sales of No-Loads
The principal method of compensating dealers for the sale of no-load
shares has been through the use of reciprocal brokerage practices00 and
294. Id. at 105.
295. New sales would be discouraged if the cost of the overall sales effort remained
constant while the number of shares sold and the amount of sales load revenue declined.
Although overall sales revenues will decline, so will the need to sell new shares and the
cost incurred in distributing them.
296. In other words, for every sales" load of which an underwriter is deprived because
a prospective purchaser bought his shares in a secondary market, a similar number of
redemptions must be avoided as a result of the investor's sale in the secondary market.
297. The SEC expects that the introduction of more effective advertising and mass
marketing techniques will reduce distribution costs significantly. 1974 REPoRT 88;
Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at i. Compare Statement of Robert Loeffler of
Investors Diversified Services, Inc., quoted in 1974 REPORT 60, with Written comment of
Philip C. Smith of National Securities and Research Corp., quoted in 1974 REPORT 53.
298. See notes 289-90 supra.
299. See notes 295-96 supra and accompanying text.
300. See generally Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975); Moses v. Burgin,
445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), noted in 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 530 (1971); Miller &
Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 35
(1971); Note, The Use of Brokerage Commissions to Promote Mutual Fund Sales, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 334 (1968); Note, Conflict of Interest in the Allocation of Mutual
Fund Brokerage Business, 80 YALE LJ. 372 (1970). When executing a trade in
portfolio securities, the adviser may place the order (and therefore the brokerage
commission) with a broker-dealer who also retails shares of the fund. This practice,
permissible as long as patronage is not given in return for the sale of fund shares, is
limited in a number of ways. First, fund officers, including the adviser, have a fiduciary
duty to the fund and its shareholders "to see the most favorable execution of portfolio
transactions . . . ." Delaware Mgmt. Co., 43 S.E.C. 392, 395 (1967). Second, if the
reciprocity practice is followed regularly, it may constitute an anticompetitive practice in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Ratner 383.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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"dealer-directed give-ups." '' The recent prohibition of such practices,
however, eliminated this compensation.3"2 Dealers are now faced with
the prospect of marketing securities for which they receive no direct, and
diminished indirect, compensation. The SEC has proposed to remove
this resultant "disincentive"303 by permitting brokers, acting indepen-
dently of the fund,30 4 to charge a fee for the sale of no-load fund shares
"somewhat comparable' to the fee charged on other investments.3 5
This approach presents two problems. First, the no-load label is
misleading if a fee is charged for the sale of the shares.30 6 Second, the
resulting variation in purchase price appears to violate the uniform price
requirement of section 22(d).30 7  The SEC has attempted to avoid
these problems by reasoning that if the broker's charge is "separate and
apart from the price of the fund share,"308 it can be distinguished from a
sales load. Thus, the purchaser pays a uniform purchase price that does
not include a sales load, but then pays a separate fee to his broker for
services rendered in connection with the sale. Arguably, such an
arrangement would maintain the uniformity of purchase price and the
truth of the no-load label.
301. A "give up" is the practice of a customer (the fund) directing the broker with
which a transaction is placed to split the commission with other brokers whom the fund
wishes to reward. In 1968, amendment of the exchanges' rules or constitutions prohibit-
ed the practice. See, e.g., NYSE Const. art. XV, § 1; AMEX Const. art. VI, § 1. See
1966 REPORT, supra note 77, at 172; Ratner, supra note 192, at 357-58; Romanski, The
Role of Advertising in the Mutual Funds Industry, 13 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 959,
972-75 (1972). Some techniques resembling the "give-up" have persisted. Romanski,
supra, at 975-76.
302. See notes 300-01 supra.
303. 1974 REPORT 110. This "disincentive" is not only harmful to the industry
because it reduces sales, but also because discrepancies in sales compensation may
"unduly influence" broker-dealers' advice to investors. 1966 REPORT 221.
304. See notes 308-12 infra and accompanying text.
305. 1974 REPORT 110.
306. This was the SEC position until 1974. See SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 7475 (Nov. 3, 1972):
The imposition of any charge for recommending the shares or for effecting the
purchase of such a fund, especially if the fund encourages or has knowledge
of the practice, has been viewed as an impermissible deviation from the pro-
spectus representation as to no-load status ....
The NASD argued that funds should not be allowed to maintain their "no-load" label if
additional charges are levied. 1974 REPORT 111, quoting Written comment of NASD.
307. Since two brokers might charge different amounts, the deviations from the no-
load "public offering price described in the prospectus" would clearly violate §
22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). See SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
7475 (Nov. 3, 1972).
308. 1974 REPORT 112-13.
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For the broker's charge to "be viewed as separate and apart," there
must be no formal or informal distribution agreement between the fund
and the dealer, 30 9 the entire fee must be retained by the broker,810 the
fund must not encourage brokers to charge such a fee,311 and the fee
may cover only services not offered by the fund. 12 Additionally, the
retailer must disclose to investors that shares are available at no load
from other dealers,31 3 the prospectus must disclose the possibility of
such a fee,3 14 and the fee must be reasonable. 1 5
This new approach to the sale of no-load shares, although laudable in
its attempt to introduce a more competitive environment, presents a
number of difficult complications. The rationale that brokers' fees can
be separated from the purchase price of the share would seem to apply
with equal force to all fund sales-and the SEC has admitted the
statutory barrier that section 22(d) presents to such action. Notwith-
standing disclosure in the prospectus that a broker's fee may be charged
on the sale, the "no-load" label inaccurately connotes that no sales
charge will be imposed. The label should be removed. 10 It is difficult
to imagine a dealer selling fund shares without at least an "informal
agreement" with the fund or its underwriter, yet the opportunity to
charge a fee for the sale of no-loads requires that there be no agree-
309. Id. But see note 316 infra and accompanying text.
310. 1974 REPORT 112. None of the service charge may be surrendered to the
underwriter because the costs are all incurred by the dealer and because the underwriter
represents the fund as its external management. See notes 10-11 supra.
311. 1974 REPORT 113.
312. Id. at 113 n.1. Expenses or fees that are "properly chargeable to sales or
promotional activities" are included in the definition of sales load. Investment Company
Act § 2(a) (35), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (35) (1970). If the fund offered the selling
services, and the broker charged for them independently, the result would be a variation
in the sales load which is impermissible under § 22(d).
313. Disclosure would guarantee that "the fee would be one which the customer
would pay voluntarily to a third person in order to compensate him for certain selling
services." 1974 REPORT 113.
314. Id.
315. The reasonableness of the fee will be determined "considering the size of the
transaction and the extent of the services provided." 1974 RRPORT 114. The SEC
contemplates that the competitive factors of negotiability of the charge and availability
of shares at no load will keep brokers' fees at a reasonable level. Id. at 114 n.1.
316. See note 306 supra. See also 1974 REPORT 111, quoting Written comment of
NASD:
Mhe designation of "no-load" constitutes the backbone of the marketing
strategies for those funds. If broker-dealers were allowed to make a charge
for "recommending and effecting" a sale, it would be misleading to character-
ize such a fund as "no-load."https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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ment 117  Further, disclosure of the possibility of such a charge in the
prospectus would appear to suggest, if not encourage, that brokers
charge such a fee. Finally, rather than responding to interpretive
requests, the SEC should formulate and adopt a rule clearly outlining
the contemplated exemption.318 In the absence of such a rule, the
distinction between "purchase price' (including a sales load) and "pur-
chase price" plus "broker's fee" is too fine to avoid confusion for
investors and challenge in court.
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The optional variations in the pricing structure of mutual fund distri-
bution have been introduced by the SEC pursuant to its power to
promulgate rules and grant exemptions from the provisions of the Invest-
ment Company Act. The SEC will need additional authority if it
becomes necessary to make the variations mandatory, or if retail price
competition is to be further introduced. As part of its program, the
SEC will forward to Congress legislation that would increase SEC
authority in two ways.319
First, the legislation would grant the SEC "increased administrative
discretion to deal flexibly with mutual fund pricing in the future."32
The 1974 Report recommended that the legislation be "analogous" 21
to a provision of the National Securities Market System Act 22 that gives
the SEC authority to
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any security or transaction or
any class of securities or transactions from any such prohibition if the
Commission deems such exemption consistent with the public interest,
the protection of investors, and the maintenance of fair and orderly
markets.3 2
3
317. See text accompanying note 309 supra.
318. Cf. text accompanying note 237 supra.
319. 1974 REPORT, supra note 12, at 115-18. As of April 19, 1976, the SEC had not
forwarded any proposed legislation to Congress.
320. Id. at 121.
321. d. at 1t6n.l.
322. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(c)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
323. Id. Compare S. REP. No. 93-865, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974) ("In light of
the possibility that the fears expressed by the NYSE and others may be realized ... the
SEC should be vested with flexible and effective power. . ."), with 1974 REPORT 116-18
("Obviously, a precise determination of what actions should be taken in the future can
only be based upon the facts appearing at that time...").
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Since it is difficult to predict the impact each newly introduced variation
in the pricing structure will have, the SEC clearly needs the desired
authority and flexibility.
Second, amendment of section 22(d) would clarify congressional
approval of the course of regulation selected by the SEC.8"4 The
introduction of variations in the pricing of mutual funds is a departure
from the traditional requirements of section 22(d). Amendment or
replacement of the section would not only remove any doubt about the
legality of the current program of voluntary price variation, but would
also ensure that retail price competition is reached with legislative en-
dorsement.
V. CONCLUSION
The retail price maintenance requirement of section 22(d) has
produced an inequitable and inefficient mutual fund distribution system.
The recent period of net redemptions and the high level of sales loads
were symptomatic of these problems. The recent modifications in SEC
regulations, to the extent that they are intended to revitalize sales and
reduce sales loads, should alleviate many of the problems.
Some of these modifications, however, have been made at the expense
of basic principles of federal securities law. The tombstone advertise-
ment, originally intended to permit announcement of an offering, now
The form this legislation will take is, however, open to some question. In a speech
before the Annual Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference, Anne P.
Jones, Director of the Division of Investment Management Regulation of the SEC,
recommended that § 22(d) be amended to be a "fair trade" law, see note 3 supra, under
which funds, at their option, could fix sales loads. See BNA SEc. REo. & L. REP. No.
334, at A-I, A-2 (March 17, 1976):
The Director advocated that the necessary legislation be structured so that the
SEC be given the authority to reinstitute compulsory fixed loads should [a]
"fair trade" system threaten the mutual fund industry's distribution system.
Should competitive loads function well, the Commission might consider re-
quiring price competition. Ms. Jones stressed that this was her own personal
view ....
Notwithstanding Ms. Jones' disclaimer, this position represents a significant recanta-
tion of the 1974 Report's commitment to move the industry toward a competitive pricing
structure.
[Aln exaggerated fear of disorderly distribution should not be permitted to
form a pretext for avoiding the introduction of price competition which, while
perhaps difficult and even unprofitable for particular funds and their underwrit-
ers... would be to the benefit of investors and the fund industry generally.
1974 RnroRT 115.
324. 1974 REPORT 115; Transmittal Letter, supra note 7, at vii.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/1
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looks like a medium capable of selling securities rather than provoking
interest in prospectuses.3 25 The retention of the "no-load" label by
funds for which a brokerage fee is charged is misleading.2 0 The SEC
should reassess these modifications, not in light of the condition of
mutual funds, but rather in light of the federal securities laws.
The SEC program, in general, is a long overdue reform. The in-
equitable and disruptive practices to which section 22(d) was addressed
are now controlled by more specific measures. The mutual fund indus-
try is now threatened, not by the dilution abuses that existed in 1940,
but rather by its reliance on the inefficient selling system that retail price
maintenance produced. The gradual change in regulation should be
accompanied by a changed selling system. Competitive variations in
sales loads are a welcome development.
325. See notes 149-61 supra and accompanying text.
326. See notes 306, 308, 316 supra and accompanying text.
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